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TOWARDS THE MAINSTREAM? THE AFD AS A CASE STUDY 
Bardh Lipa 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The radical right-wing party, the Alternative für Deutschland, caused a political tremor in 
2017 German election by changing the political landscape significantly while becoming the 
third largest party in the Bundestag. Also, with most of the studies that asses AfD’s 
development being published while the party was starting to transform itself, the Euro crisis 
has lost its urgency, and given that party has been going through internal struggles for a while 
between ‘liberals’ and ‘extremists’ leads to the question on whether the AfD has shifted 
towards the mainstream? This dissertation works with the definition of ‘mainstreaming’ 
provided by Akkerman et al. (2016) and assess the party change along four key dimensions: 
1) changes with respect to radical positions on core issues; 2) changes from a niche party to 
a party that focused on socioeconomic issues; 3) changes in the anti-establishment profile; 
and 4) changes regarding the party reputation. The research strategy adopted to this 
dissertation is the qualitative case study and consisted of a review of relevant literature the 
topic, coupled with the collection and analysis of a comprehensive range source of data. The 
findings from this research show that there is no sign that the AfD is shifting towards the 
mainstream; on the contrary, the party is tending to radicalize along first three dimensions 
while showing signs of mainstreaming on the fourth dimension to avoid possible juridical 
actions.  
 
Keywords: mainstreaming, radical, niche, anti-establishment, extreme reputation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With no success at the national level, the radical right-wing parties in Germany have been 
unable to consolidate a steady base of support. There have been four different waves of such 
parties since the Second World War which portray both their emergence and end over the 
course of time (Williams, 2006, p. 116). This means that the radical right-wing German 
parties experienced local success which, however, did not last and instead of getting more 
support during the upcoming years, a decline followed.   
A breakthrough came during the German federal elections that were held in 2017 when the 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) made German political history. The success of the AfD as 
a radical right-wing party was unprecedented. Nearly six million Germans (12.6 % of those 
who voted) voted for the AfD, compared to 4.7% in the 2013 federal elections. Not only that, 
but it also became the third largest party in the Bundestag (the German federal parliament), 
with a notable performance in eastern Germany while performing strongly in other parts of 
Germany as well. Furthermore, when a phenomenon like this occurs in a country with a past 
like Germany during the 40s, the developments are taken very seriously by scholars, media 
and politicians (Hansen & Olsen, 2018, p. 1). Media followed the victory of the AfD with 
headlines such as “Far-right AFD success shocks Germany” ("Far-right AFD success shocks 
Germany," Euronews, 2017). Likewise, although arguing that the relationship between the 
AfD and its voters is weak and him being quite skeptical as to whether the AfD will possibly 
remain a third force in the German politics, Cas Mudde referred to it as “stunning success” 
(Mudde, 2017). 
Be that as it may,  the “stunning success” succes draws attention to the fact that the AfD has 
been going through internal struggles and discords for a while now. For instance, one day 
after the elections, the AfD suffered its first split as the leader Frauke Petry left, an act that 
can be seen as a public manifestation of the difficulties of the party (Chazan, 2017). Almost 
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two years before the 2017 German federal elections, a study concluded that the AfD’s ability 
to become a lasting force depends on its ability to convince the German voters that it is not a 
single-issue party (Grimm, 2015, p. 274). The single issue was the single currency which was 
a unique selling point for the AfD, but it is essential to keep in mind that the Euro crisis had 
lost much of its urgency in early 2015, and the party focused on broadening their 
programmatic profile and shedding the image of being a single-issue party (Arzheimer, 2015, 
p. 9). Given these points, the success of the AfD in the 2017 federal elections on the one hand, 
and the internal discords and infighting between ordoliberals and ever louder voices of the 
radical right faction on the other hand (Grimm, 2015, p. 274) raises the questions as to 
whether the party is in the process of mainstreaming, has already gone through such a 
process, or have been there efforts to mainstream their agendas (always in accordance to the 
political landscape).  
In contrast to the AfD, there is a substantial amount of research on the endeavors of other 
radical right-wing parties in Europe to move into the mainstream (Akkerman, Tjitske; De 
Lange, Sarah L; Rooduijn, Matthijs, 2016; Usherwood, 2016; Ivaldi, 2014; Jupskäs, 2016). 
With this in mind, referring to the case selection criteria of one of the major studies published 
in 2016 which deals with the degree to which radical right-wing populist parties have shifted 
to become a part of the mainstream. Including the factors and conditions which enable this 
drift to take place (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 4) the AfD itself was not included as a case study 
because only the parties that had already gained an electoral breakthrough and for whom 
national office is, at least in the longer term, a realistic option, were selected (Akkerman et 
al. 2016, p. 21).   
The situation has changed after the results of the 2017 German federal elections which in 
turn means that the AfD is now eligible as a case study for the chosen theoretical framework 
which will be elaborate below. The AfD has not been nor is not part of a coalition, therefore 
it is important to note that participation in the government or a coalition was not a criterion 
for the case selection. Equally important, when looking at previous studies on the AfD, some 
of them focus on the candidates of the AfD by using a scaling procedure to assess, among 
other things, whether the candidates are more liberal or authoritarian compared to the 
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candidates of different German parties (Jankowski, Schneider, & Tepe, 2017). Some studies 
explore the attitudes and motives of the Alternative für Deutschland voters (Berbuir, Marcel, 
& Siri, 2015), or policy positions from the AfD program (Arzheimer, 2015). The scholars 
find that the AfD’s political performance absorbed specific German political constellations 
that, among other things, explain the dropping of anti-Islam as a major campaign issue eariler 
on (Berbuir, Marcel, & Siri, 2015, p. 157). Since 2013 the German societal and political 
setting has undergone significant changes which have to do with internal conditions such as 
party organization, factionalism, leadership change and election results at local and national 
level. Moreover, most of the studies of AfD development have been written and published as 
the party was just starting to develop and transform itself. Given these insufficiencies, the 
AfD might have developed in different directions over time, including radicalization and 
moving towards the mainstream, the latter of which will be the focal point of this thesis. All 
things considered, this project is an attempt to fill the existing research gap on this issue. 
Because of the limits of the thesis, the history of the AfD and finally considering that 
mainstreaming is a prolonged process going over at least two electoral cycles the scope will 
be restricted on the period from the German federal election of 2013 until late 2017. The 
research question is: Has the AfD been moving towards the mainstream? If yes, what are the 
main factors that have prompted this transformation?  The questions will be approached 
qualitatively, although when available, quantitative data is used to examine the party (such 
as voter’s base of support and electoral results). This work will be embedded in the general 
framework of Akkerman, Tjitske; De Lange, Sarah L; Rooduijn, Matthijs (2016). 
To measure whether the AfD has moved towards the mainstream, four dimensions will be 
used, namely: (1) radical party, (2) niche party and (3) anti-establishment party, (4) the 
extreme right reputation (Table 1), as in line with the general framework, radical right 
populist parties are identified as simultaneously radical, niche and anti-establishment 
political with an extreme right reputation (Akkerman et al. 2016, 116).  
As of yet, the theoretical framework which derives from Akkerman et al. and their four 
mainstreaming dimensions have not been implemented in the case of the AfD to assess 
whether the developments in Western Europe, within the German political landscape and 
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changes within the party itself have induced the AfD to move towards the mainstream. 
Furthermore, many research articles have examined the party’s historical development, 
election manifestos, its candidates, ties with PEGIDA and other extremist movements. At the 
same time, although the value of the earlier work on the AfD is undeniable, a number of them 
fall short as many of those studies were written and published as the party was developing 
(Hansen and Olsen, 2018, p. 2). The aim of this work is therefore merely to contribute to 
filling this gap in the literature by assessing the AfD based on the most up-to-date data in 
combination with four dimensions derived from the general theoretical framework. To 
include a broader analysis, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (to contribute to a systematic 
analysis of the mainstreaming positions) and Manifesto Project Database (to assess the 
salience of the issues) has been complemented with the analysis of primary sources of 
evidence which are the AfD’s 2013 and 2017 election manifestos. Additional information is 
drawn from a wide range of media sources. This provides the most up-to-date data from 
which conclusions can draw on whether the AfD has shifted toward the mainstream.  
The thesis is divided into four main parts. The first chapter provides a theoretical foundation 
to introduce the main concepts that are used throughout the thesis. The second chapter deals 
with the methodological framework. The methodology chapter is followed by an introduction 
to the German party system and populist legacy in Germany which forms the basis for the 
main analysis. The empirical data is described, analyzed, and synthesized in the fourth 
chapter, that is followed by a conclusion which features a discussion of the main findings of 
this thesis while summarizing the theoretical contribution of this thesis.  
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
This chapter aims to outline the different theoretical concepts, theories, and models that are 
crucial to the chosen subject and case study. The case study is the radical right-wing populist 
party AfD, and the central concept is mainstreaming.  
 
1.1. Defining radical right-wing populism  
Although nowadays the term ‘radical right-wing populism’ is used very often in both public 
and scientific debate mainly because the term is associated with the emergence of new parties 
in Europe, it is widely acknowledged that defining populism per se is quite a challenging task 
and that there is an extensive debate among scholars on the topic which is still going on. As 
Mudde (2007) puts it, there is a terminological chaos due to the consequence of a lack of 
clear definitions (p. 12) leading to a lack of a general agreement on how the radical right-
wing populism is defined and what are its core elements. One of the reasons for that is that 
many radical right-wing parties do not possess similar characteristics (Hainsworth, 2000, p. 
23). The other reason is that radical parties have a tendency to rise in waves (Mudde, 2000, 
p. 6) and each wave keeps bringing new elements which have not been central to the radical 
right-wing parties in the past, specifically during the earlier waves and therefore such new 
elements that are part of the fourth wave have not been studied before in relation to the 
political landscape. The Euro-crisis, the onset of the migrant crisis in 2015, and the flexibility 
of the party to shift in orientation strategically used by the AfD to tackle the issues and pursue 
its goals place the party in the fourth wave of radical right party family.  
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1.1.1 Radical right as a rejection of individual and social equality  
As stated above, there is a lack of agreement among scholars on how the radical right-wing 
populism is defined and what its core elements are. This, however, poses an important 
question: How is it possible to decide which definitions provided by literature are the most 
suitable for the research aim of this thesis? 
Due to its relevance and influence in regard to the chosen theoretical framework, I will start 
with the basic definition provided by Akkerman et al. (2016) where ‘radical right-wing 
populism’ describes a group of parties that “are right-wing in their rejection of individual and 
social equality” (p. 5). Two main concepts stand out from this definition, specifically 1) the 
rejection of individual; 2) the rejection of social equality. Therefore, right-wing radical 
parties are just a variety of identarian politics, meaning that they display the tendencies of 
the people that tend to differentiate themselves from the others, whether by race, religion or 
tradition, to construct a line between them and the ‘others’. The same logic follows the 
rejection of social equality, wherein practical terms, for instance, it means that an immigrant 
with a different religious background cannot be treated equally with the other members of 
the group. Hence, the equality as such should be rejected. 
In addition, as Rodriquez-Aguileria (2014) observes, in most of the cases, right-wing radical 
parties not only distance ‘the others’ from ‘them’, but also try to separate themselves from 
the party structure within the country which is often accused for betraying the values of the 
people and for not representing the true people (p. 178). He further argues that right-wing 
radical parties today are based on three core ideas: the chauvinistic and ethnic exaltation of 
the nation; anti-immigrant xenophobia; ‘anti-politician’, and anti-establishment populism (p. 
178). He adds that right-wing radical parties show their radicalism in two ways, namely the 
outright rejection of non-EU immigration and, increasingly, the rejection of the EU itself (p. 
178). Hence, parties take radical, non-centrist positions on issues that are central to their 
ideology and they are populist “in their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior 
common sense” (cited in Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 6). When applied to everyday politics, the 
political discussions and issues are presented in a simplified language, thereby the solution 
for the problem does not seem complicated in itself as it is just ‘us’ against ‘them.’ 
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Lastly, the nativist element of radical right-wing populist parties presented by Mudde enables 
us to understand better the juxtaposition of ‘us’ and ‘them’ followed by the two other 
elements combined which are part of the ideology embraced by parties, namely 
authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2014, p. 218). Even though all three core elements 
are equally important and all will be elaborated as such, for this thesis the nativist element 
stands out mainly because of the charge it carries and since nativism according to the author 
is the primary ideological feature of the radical right-wing populist parties  (Mudde, 2007, p. 
22). 
1.1.2 Nativism as the primary ideological feature of the radical right-wing parties 
According to Mudde (2007), nativism forms the core of the ideology of the radical right-
wing populist parties and is defined as ‘xenophobic form of nationalism’ because the nativist 
dimension includes a combination of both, nationalism and xenophobia (p. 22). This implies 
that those who are not natives and carry non-native elements, such as immigrants with a 
different background (the others), are perceived as a threat to the nation (Mudde, 2014, p. 
218). When translated into programmatic positions, nativism leads to anti-immigration 
stances, and in recent years it has also led to anti-European Union and anti-Islamic stances 
(Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 5). Akkerman et al. argue that since the early 2000s the focus has 
shifted to Islam as a non-native religion in Western Europe (p. 5). This shift to Islam adheres 
to a nativist critique on why Islamic values cannot go together with the liberal values which 
Western Europe is identified with, such as liberal democracy, personal freedoms, the 
approach towards same-sex relationships and marriage, the separation of religion and state, 
equality of men and women, just to name a few. Further, nativism translated into 
programmatic positions is causally related to the AfD on core issues on the 2017 manifesto.  
Moreover, seeing how radical right-wing parties in Europe are often and increasingly referred 
to as populist parties, Jens Rydgren (2017) used the literature on populism to examine the 
extent to which it applies to the contemporary radical right-wing parties in Europe. The 
author argues that labeling radical right-wing parties as ‘populist parties’ it is misleading as 
populism is not the most relevant feature of this party family. Instead, ethnic nationalism is 
a key defining element of this party family. The author recommends putting an end to the 
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increasing trend of calling the contemporary radical right-wing parties ‘populist’ not because 
these parties lack populist features, but because the populist elements are not the most 
pertinent features of these parties (Rydgren, 2017, p. 493). 
Furthermore, Rydgren argues that this party family is mainly focused on issues that are 
related to national identity and security, including the threat coming from immigration, Islam, 
multiculturalism. Also, they push the people against the political elites that are perceived as 
responsible for the cultural and political threat against what they view as the ideal image of 
their nation-state (Rydgren, 2017, p. 493). In this context, ethno-nationalism involves the 
idea of invigorating the nation by making it ethnically homogeneous and by returning to 
fundamental values.  
Although nativism is often understood as ethnic nationalism and is used interchangeably with 
ethno-nationalism or ethnic nationalism (Arter, 2010, pp. 492-495), Aitana Guia (2016) 
disagrees with the use of the terms in such an improper manner. Even though she agrees that 
terms such as ethnic nationalism, ethno-nationalism, or mono-culture nationalism are 
necessary to understand distinct types of nationalism, none of them apprehend the core of 
nativism, and some of them may obscure non-ethnic types of nativism (p. 5). She argues that 
nativism should be differentiated from such concepts and the main reason to not mix nativism 
with ethnic nationalism is that nativism can be civic as well; and as such in Europe merges 
both elements, leading her to the following conclusion:  
            
 “While the duality between ethnic and civic nationalisms has been heavily criticized 
(Xenos 1996; Yack 1996; Özkirimli 2005: 24-26), the interpretative power of this typology 
has been incredibly influential. In civic nationalism, ‘the nation is defined in terms of a shared 
commitment to the public institutions of the state and civil society,’ while ethnic nationalism 
emphasizes common descent and cultural sameness (Özkirimli 2005:23). Civic conceptions 
of the nation can be inclusive as long as new members accept the nation’s political creed, 
while ethnic notions of the ‘nation’ are more exclusionary.”     
                                                                                               (Guia, 2016, p. 5). 
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In Germany for instance, the anti-immigration discourse pushed forward by the AfD at its 
various stages of development uses both ethnic and civic arguments. The appeal to the 
German nativeness as opposed to inhabitants of Germany with another ethnic background 
(foreigners) falls within the ethnic understanding, while the idea of the “Christian West” and 
stances against Muslims and Islam per se fall within civic arguments and nativism  
 
1.1.3 Authoritarianism  
Authoritarianism is defined as a strict belief in order and its stringent enforcement within 
society through discipline, law and order-based policies (Mudde, 2014, p. 218). Therefore, 
the authoritarian dimension is directly related to the attitudes and stances of political parties 
towards individual freedoms. Mudde has observed that populist radical right-wing parties 
believe that the state should have a strict legal system and those that do not obey the 
authorities will suffer the consequences of punishment. The issue here is that this statement 
is rather general and can be applied to almost every structure. Therefore, two other elements 
which hold a better explanatory power are more useful here, namely the obedience and the 
uncritical attitude. The first one is the inclination to be obedient, and the latter is about having 
an uncritical attitude towards the leading figures. However, the authoritarian’s submission to 
authority, established or not, is not absolute, automatic, nor blind (cited in Mudde, 2014, p. 
23). In other words, while authoritarians will be more inclined to accept (established) 
authority than nonauthoritarians, they can and will rebel under certain circumstances (Mudde 
2014, p. 23). Even though Mudde acknowledges that they can rebel under certain 
circumstances, he does not clarify under which circumstances authoritarians are inclined to 
rebel against the authority. 
It is here that Kai Arzheimer (2015) argument becomes especially useful. Authoritarianism, 
he claims, goes against some of the core values of democratic regimes such as tolerance, 
pluralism, and the protection of minorities and their rights (p. 3). In the case of the AfD, there 
is a call for a strong authoritarian state and leader which goes against these values above. As 
found by Berbuir, Lewandowsky & Siri (2014) in their effort to sketch the socio-economic 
background of the AfD sympathizers and their political positions, one of the matters that they 
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focus on is the acceptance of authoritarian structures (p. 168). Forty-five percent of the AfD 
sympathizers agreed completely or tended to agree on the statement ‘Germany needs a strong 
leader that can quickly decide on everything,’ showing a notable desire for authoritarian 
politics (pp. 168-170). Moreover, the AfD sympathizers embrace authoritarian views much 
more than those who do not support the party (p. 171). 
 
1.1.4 Populism   
In the contemporary literature, there are many approaches to populism that interpret the 
phenomenon differently, among others, as an ideology, political strategy, discourse and logic 
(Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 381). Nevertheless, this study primarily relies on the definition 
provided by Mudde. According to Mudde (2014), populism makes a distinction within the 
society by dividing it into two groups, the pure and the corrupt elite, and wants politics to 
reflect the general will of the people (p. 218). Most scholars accept these two concepts ("the 
elite" and "the people") as integral to defining populism as it is argued that there is a clash 
and that elites have betrayed the trust of the people (Canovan, 1999, pp. 3-6).  
However, Jan‐Werner Müller (2014) is one of the scholars that does not seem to appraise that 
much the importance of theorizations like the one provided by Mudde. He argues that a 
theory of populism as a means to comprehend a political phenomenon is necessary. A theory 
that is neither just an ideology nor a style, nor a particular kind of party or movement (p. 
484). Even though the criteria to identify populist claims are essential, an account of 
populism as a particular sequence of actions which tend to be in line with the implications of 
the significant claims that populist make is also required. Thus, a simple definition of 
populism is not enough as it is necessary to also understand populism as a dynamic process 
(Müller, 2014, p. 484). Müller continues further by dismissing several of what he considers 
as false ways of understanding the phenomenon, such as ‘losers of modernization or 
globalization,’ ‘distancing social-psychological profile’ and ‘the lack of quality in policies.’ 
All these ways of starting to understand populism per se are false according to Müller because 
to a certain degree they are subjective and that such a distinction is not enough to identify 
politicians as populists. For example, in the case of ‘the lack of quality in policies’ where 
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populists are portrayed as people that make irrational and irresponsible policies to fulfill the 
short-term desires of the people, Müller asks the logical question about who draws the line 
between responsible and irresponsible policies (p. 485)?  
 
In the absence of a  new dimension from which to explore the phenomenon of populism 
Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey (2013) criticize the four dominant conceptions of 
populism – as ideology, logic, discourse, and strategy – as they each post a specific problem 
(p. 383). They proceed by identifying the main shortcomings of the four approaches before 
introducing a new category of ‘political style’ as a new way of thinking about the 
phenomenon. One of the main approaches which are criticized is precisely the conception of 
populism as an ideology which is attributed to the contribution of Cas Mudde. The main issue 
is with the idea of ‘thin ideology’ and whether a thin ideology can become so thin as to lose 
its conceptual validity and utility (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 383).  
 
Moffitt & Tormey argue that different from other ideologies such as feminism for instance, 
no one self-identifies as ‘populist’, there is no kind of global ‘populist movement’ and there 
are no key philosophers or theoreticians of populism, nor texts that seek to ‘thicken’ its 
‘ideational density’ (p. 383). The conclusion is that it does not make sense to conceptualize 
populism as an ideology considering the ‘thinness’ of the concept. The authors do not deny 
the importance of ideational element that the term carries but argue that ideational elements 
are better conceptualized as part of populism’s political style (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 
384). The concept of political style is defined as “the repertoires of performance that are used 
to create political relations” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 387). Meaning that they are 
interested in how the performances of those involved influence the relationship between the 
populist leader and ‘the people,’ and vice versa (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 387).  
 
1.2 The new versus the old  
Piero Ignazi (1999) has thoroughly analyzed the third wave of radical right-wing parties, and 
by doing so, he has identified two types of radical right-wing parties: the old type which has 
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fascist associations, and the new type which has no fascist associations but has adopted ‘anti-
system’ attitudes instead (pp. 3-6). To make the difference between these two different 
groups, Ignazi relies on two elements which are the history/ideology of the party and the 
attitude towards the political system. The former enables to assess whether the party has 
shown a connection with the fascist ideology in its original form that goes back to the period 
before the Second World War. The latter, the position that the party has adopted on the 
political system itself, can be used to determine whether the political party has an anti-system 
approach. Nevertheless, sometimes parties’ distance themselves from any fascist 
associations. In relation to this, Mudde argues that this tendency of right-wing radical parties 
to distance themselves from old neo-fascist parties is merely strategic in order to be more 
appealing for the electorate (Mudde, 2007, pp. 256-260). With that aside, this distinction is 
significant for two main reasons: (1) It can help to better explain and access the success of 
right-wing radical parties nowadays in Europe. (2) It is directly related to the fourth 
dimension of mainstreaming embedded in the theoretical framework, which is extreme right 
reputation with elements of anti-Semitic/racist expressions, and ties with extremists.  
The extreme right reputation of a party is a highly relevant issue for right-wing populist 
parties as these parties have origins in the extreme right and hardcore nationalist subcultures. 
If a party has a neo-fascist origin and is qualified as an old party, then it tends not to avoid 
the extremist reputation, the racist/xenophobic discourse, anti-immigration positions as much 
as a new populist one would because of the fear of legal consequences such as being banned. 
Also, different from the old parties, the new populist parties tend to avoid the classic 
extremist reputation for office-seeking reasons. In the first category of old parties that tend 
not to avoid the extremist reputation are the Greek neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn and 
Hungary’s far-right Jobbik. The first one due to its paramilitary structure, xenophobic 
elements, and the actual violence against the immigrants in Greece. The latter, due to linkage 
to the legacy of the sinister “Arrow Cross” party (the Hungarian Nazis from the final stages 
of WWII) and espouses an anti-Roma, anti-gay and anti-EU agenda (Rodríguez-Aguilera, 
2014, pp. 179-181). 
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1.3 What it means to belong to the mainstream?  
The term ‘mainstream’ is used in different contexts and areas and as such is usually poorly 
defined. Looking into it from the etymological perspective and in its purest form the term 
refers to a set of shared values, beliefs, and approaches in a specific period which is embraced 
by most of the people within a group or society (Oxford Dictionaries, 2017). It is certain that 
the substance of the term has changed depending on the time and the circumstances in which 
it was used and that it carries different connotations which are dependent on the observer’s 
scope and necessity. In other words, in different political regimes and different historical 
periods what is ‘mainstream’ has meant something else in comparison with what it means 
nowadays in most of the European countries.  
Today, in the field of political science, public debates and specifically in political parties’ 
context to be a ‘mainstream’ party means to be in contrast with a radical party, an extreme 
right-wing, extreme left-wing party, anti-system party, anti-establishment party, and the list 
goes on with the ‘terminological chaos’ as Mudde (2017) puts it. The term 'mainstream' in 
the political context refers most often to political parties that are ideologically positioned on 
the center-left and right center spectrum, that is Christian democratic, conservative, liberal, 
and social democratic parties (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 7).  
Also, another element which is identified by Cappocia (1999) is the loyalty of the established 
parties to the political system and the fact that they have no tendencies to overthrow it, which 
also is in line with the way political parties are ideologically positioned. In sum, a political 
party is in the mainstream when it is ideologically centrist, when there are no elements of 
radicalism and xenophobia as part of the political platform and public debate, no extreme 
rhetoric referring that goes back to Nazi period is shown, no ties with fascist groups, no calls 
for radical change of the political system itself, no radical opposition on further integration. 
Thus, the term ‘mainstream’ can encompass programmatic and positional centrism, the high 
salience of socioeconomic issues, and behavior and stances that show commitment to the 
principles of liberal democracy and to the formal and informal rules of the political game 
(Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 7). 
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1.4 Mainstreaming as a process  
Even though the research on the concept of ‘mainstreaming’ per se is scarce, in recent years 
within the extensive body of literature on radical right-wing parties, a significant number of 
studies related to the mainstreaming of party goals and strategies, the political discourse of 
radical right-wing parties and their shifting from margin towards a more mainstream kind of 
style has emerged. Hannah Moscovitz (2016) argues that this shift is evidenced through the 
example of many parties, including Austrian Freedom Party, Flemish Vlaams Belang, the 
Front National and the British National Party (p. 142).  
Mainstreaming as a process is a crucial concept to understand the shifting of a political party 
from the periphery towards the center. Mainstreaming usually refers to a process of 
convergence of two different types of parties, mainstream parties on the one hand, and 
radical parties on the other (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 6). As such, the concept lacks clarity 
mainly because it is used to describe the changes of mainstream parties toward radical parties 
and changes of radical parties towards mainstream parties. According to Bomberg (2002) 
and Mair (2001) green parties, for instance, have become more like the mainstream left and 
vice versa; the former moderated their programmatic stances and adjusted their party 
organization, and the latter embraced environmental issues (cited in Akkerman et al. 2016, 
p. 6). When parties undertake changes such as moderating their stances and change their 
approach towards mainstream parties itself it also means that they are getting closer to the 
mainstream and by doing this they become more eligible to be considered as a coalition 
partner. Müller-Rommel observes that green parties have become “coalitionable due to these 
changes and have hence governed with left-wing mainstream parties” (cited in Akkerman et 
al. 2016, p. 6).  
However, radical right-wing populist parties do not necessarily use their chance to form a 
coalition to become a part of the government even when such an opportunity arises. For 
instance, because of the results in the last German federal elections the AfD became an 
essential player in the German political landscape, however, on the one hand it seemed that 
they have no incentive to form a coalition, and on the other, mainstream parties like the one 
led by Merkel (CDU) decided in advance that they would not even consider the possibility 
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of getting in the coalition with a party such as the AfD because of what it represents (Rinke, 
2017). These developments are significant because the changes in opportunities cannot 
explain party change (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 9). The reasons for which a radical right-wing 
populist party might decide not to become part of a coalition vary and are influenced by many 
factors such as losing the voters supports or merely being unable to adapt their policies and 
fear of losing their influence. This entire process gets even more complicated when one of 
the defining critical elements of political parties is considered, namely, the desire to get to 
power and govern. 
Wagner and Meyer (2017) examine whether radical right parties have moderated their 
positions to earn greater respect or to have better chances at entering government. The authors 
claim that when a radical right party moderates its positions to pursue something, two main 
developments can take place: 1) it is likely that the radical right parties have joined the 
ideological mainstream of European parties; 2) as the mainstream parties see the 
developments and feel threatened by radical right parties because of the way they are 
approaching some of the issues with which the society is faced, the mainstream parties decide 
to act by changing their policy stances (Meyer & Wagner, 2013, pp. 84-85). This is known 
as the process in which mainstream parties accommodate the radical right by adopting their 
policy stances. The result of this process would also be a mainstreaming of the radical right 
in European party competition (Wagner & Meyer, 2017, p. 85). Finally, after analyzing the 
data, the authors conclude that mainstream parties have become more like the radical right, 
meaning that the shift has taken place from the center towards the margin by the mainstream 
parties and which was manifested by the radicalization of issue positions and issue salience. 
However, the authors find that this does not happen with the radical right parties, as they 
have been unable to find evidence that shows that radical right parties have become more 
moderate, which in turn means that they have kept its niche regarding policy positions over 
time (Wagner and Meyer, 2017, p. 97).  
Mainstreaming is also conceived as a party strategy, a strategy that is designed to promote 
the pursuit of office, policy or votes, or a combination of these goals (Akkerman et al. 2016, 
p. 14). The strategy can consist of one of the dimensions of mainstreaming (Table 1), or it 
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can be a mix of those dimensions. Radical right-wing populist parties can moderate their 
positions on core issues, expand their issue agenda, show more respect for the rules of the 
game or try to overcome their extremist reputation (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 14). The 
mainstreaming of the radical right-wing populist parties can occur because of the pursuit of 
the office, policy-seeking, and vote-seeking. These can be a trade-off, and dependent on 
many factors (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 11) which can be external and internal.  
Party goals and strategies are defined by external and internal factors (Akkerman et al. 2016, 
p. 10). There are two distinct types of external factors. The first type includes changes in 
cleavages, electoral markets and in media agendas as well as socioeconomic change and in 
the emergence of new policy problems in society (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 17). The second 
type includes changes in the political systems in which radical right-wing populist parties 
operate, in the structure of party competition resulting from party system change in which 
main competitors react (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 17). Internal factors also influence party 
change. These conditions include, but are not limited to, party organization, leadership and 
factionalism, and experiences in local and regional political arenas (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 
17). 
Considering the convergence attached to the concept of mainstreaming, the use of it in such 
a way is not adequate for this thesis. Concerning that, ‘mainstreaming’ is defined as a process 
in which radical parties change to become more like mainstream parties (Akkerman et al. 
2016, p. 14). Hence, this thesis will use the concept of mainstreaming which purely focuses 
on the shift from the margin toward the center.  
Lastly, it is important to note that in order to trace a shift from the margin towards the 
mainstream it is not necessary to have an extreme shift in all of the mainstreaming dimensions 
(Table 1), instead, a single shift in an issue such as moderation of positions on immigration 
can be observed under the light of shifting towards the mainstream.  
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1.5 Niche parties  
Bonnie M. Meguid (2005) argues that although new political parties have emerged in the past 
40 years, many of these new parties are just variants of the existing parties which fit in the 
liberal, conservative, or socialist group of parties (p. 346). However, there is a group of 
parties that stand out and which the author identifies as ‘niche parties’ (Meguid, 2005, p. 
345). The niche party concept was introduced by Meguid himself who considers niche parties 
to be mainly characterized by the emphasis on a small set of issues that their mainstream 
rivals pay little attention to (cited in M. Meyer & Wagner, 2013, p. 1247). Meguid points out 
three significant ways in which niche parties are different from the mainstream parties.  
First, rejection of traditional class-based orientation of politics. This means that instead of 
focusing on economic demands, these parties politicize sets of issues which were previously 
outside the dimensions of party competition (M. Meguid, 2005, p. 347). Meguid continues 
by providing examples of political parties such as the Green parties during the 1970s and 
radical right parties that have politicized issues that were neglected by their mainstream 
counterparts (i.e., Green parties mainly focusing on environmental issues, such as nuclear 
power and disarmament and environmental protection). Meyer and Wagner (2013) argue that 
although niche parties compete on different issues compared to mainstream rivals, this party 
family deliberately choose and switch between niche and mainstream profiles, in part due to 
strategic incentives (p. 1247). In other words, a party may decide to adopt or to drop a niche 
or mainstream party profile out of vote-seeking considerations (Meyer & Wagner, 2013, p. 
1247). However, if a party does not suffer losses in elections, then it is less likely to change 
the focus of their program.  
Second, the issues raised by niche parties are not only new but sometimes they do not even 
coincide with the existing lines of political division as niche parties appeal to groups of voters 
that may cross-cut traditional partisan alignments (Meguid, 2005, p. 348).  
Third, which is crucial for the minimal definition of the niche parties itself is the 
differentiation that they make between themselves and their mainstream counterparts by 
limiting the number of the issues with which they deal. In other words, they are often seen as 
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single-issue parties by the voters because they are focused on a limited number of issues. 
Therefore, niche parties rely on the salience and attractiveness of their one policy stance for 
voter support (Meguid, 2005, p. 348).  
Niche is an important concept for this thesis as through it we can assess whether the policy 
agenda of the AfD has emphasized sociocultural issues above all or whether it has 
increasingly focused on socioeconomic issues as well, which in turn would indicate that the 
AfD has shifted toward the mainstream on the second dimension.   
 
1.7 Anti-establishment parties (with a stress on right-wing parties)  
In general, when the term ‘anti-establishment’ is mentioned, usually it is presumed that those 
parties constitute a prominent threat to the regime itself and this is perceived as very negative. 
Even though that has proven to be true, especially in the past, the threat element it is somehow 
a dependent claim depending on the type of the regime itself and other factors such as the 
political landscape and is more practical rather than theoretical (Cappocia, 2002). 
Theoretically, anti-establishment parties are the opposite of mainstream parties mainly due 
to the ideological distance that they have not only with the other parties but with the system 
itself. When defined based on their loyalty to the political system itself, anti-establishment 
parties fall in the list mainly because they are seen as parties whose primary goal is to 
overthrow the political system altogether with norms and values on which it is based 
(Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 7). Akkerman et al. argue that two elements stand out in the case 
of the anti-establishment party, namely 1) their anti-establishment positions, 2) the rules of 
the game are challenged (p. 7). 
Giovani Cappocia (2002) further clarifies the use of the concept of anti-system parties for 
comparative purposes in the context of democratic regimes. He develops a new typology and 
concludes that during the last century many political parties were wrongly classified as anti-
system parties and were not correctly used in comparative analyses by scholars. He argues 
that while the authors have tried to conceptualize the changes that radical opposition had 
caused in democratic systems, the strategy most commonly followed by scholars has been 
that of creating new 'anti'- terms, often ad hoc and without specifying the logical 
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consequences of their application to different cases (Cappocia, 2002, p. 32). As Cappocia has 
shown, it is possible for scholars to fail in their attempts to determine the ideological position 
of a political party. An example of such an attempt is the research conducted by Klikauer 
(2018) in which he concludes that the AfD is “Germany’s new Nazi party,” (p. 625).  
The findings of Cappocia are important for this thesis as in the current political environment 
of the European political landscape and established political parties, the emergence of new 
issues and new political parties calls for the need to quickly adapt strategies as a response to 
changes and challenges, which in turn means that the ideological shifting from margin 
towards center or the opposite, at least theoretically, is very likely. This shifting that occurs 
is also elaborated by Mudde when he talks about the challenges of circularity and criteria that 
we should use to be able to define different political parties. Mudde argues that there is a 
solution that might overcome this problem of circularity, and that is by adopting the 
Wittgensteinian concept of “family resemblance” (cited in Mudde, 2007, p. 13). Meaning 
that political parties are not entirely the same, but they still possess similar characteristics 
and elements (Mudde, 2007, p.13).  
Although parties possess similar characteristics, there is a key difference between radical 
right-wing parties and extreme right parties which is determined by the type of democracy 
that they are opposed to. Namely, extreme right parties are against democracy in the general 
sense as they have displayed a similar pattern of undermining system legitimacy whereas 
radical right parties are against liberal democracy (Ignazi, 2003, p. 200). In relation to 
extreme right parties, another vital element for this thesis which will be taken into 
consideration is the party reputation — specifically, the extreme right reputation of a party 
which is essential when dealing with radical right-wing parties and trying to assess their shift 
from the margin towards the mainstream. Akkerman et al. argue that anti-Semitism, racism 
or positive references to the Nazism or Fascism are elements which are mostly associated 
with the parties that have an extreme right reputation. The authors admit that radical right-
wing populist parties generally risk being branded as racist due to their nativist ideology and 
anti-immigration positions (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 278). For instance, a German party 
would have an extreme right reputation if it emphasizes German nationalism, referred to the 
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Nazi period, uses extreme rhetoric and does not distance itself from anti-Semitism and these 
are the criteria that will be implemented later on.  
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2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter will elaborate on research questions, the research strategy was chosen to address 
the research objectives together with the data collection methods for analysis, including the 
framework for data analysis and finally, will address the potential problems and limitations 
of this work.  
 
2.1 Research aim and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is: to assess whether the AfD is going through a phase of mainstreaming 
and to investigate whether the party is pursuing a more ‘mainstream’ political engagement in 
the western and a more ‘radical’ engagement in the eastern parts of Germany and why.  
To build a comprehensive view of the research topic, the research will answer the following 
questions: 
1) Has the AfD been moving towards the mainstream?  
2) If such a shift has taken place, what are the main factors that have prompted this 
transformation? 
The four dimensions (party reputation included) that derive from the theoretical framework 
enable us to form two possible suggestions: 1) the less a radical right party is still a radical, 
niche and anti-establishment party with an extreme reputation, the more it can be proved to 
have moved towards the mainstream, 2) the more a radical right party has changed its policy 
profile, extended its attention to socioeconomic issues and moderated its anti-establishment 
positions, the more it has moved towards the mainstream. 
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2.2 Research Strategy  
The research strategy that will be used to implement the empirical research is the qualitative 
case study. The single-case study approach has been chosen because it allows a more in-
depth analysis to assess whether and to what extent the AfD has moved towards the 
mainstream and also allows the use of multiple methods of data collection to achieve an in-
depth understanding with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion (Yin, 2003, p. 
14). This triangulation may lead to data sources that previously have not been considered and 
which in turn it will increase the accuracy of research results. Yin (2013) defines a case as 
study as: 
“An empirical inquiry that  
         • Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when  
          • The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). 
In addition, the purpose of this method is to analyze the following changes: 1) changes with 
respect to radical positions on core issues like immigration, EU or authoritarianism; 2) 
changes from a niche party to a party with a broad policy agenda that equally emphasizes 
sociocultural and socioeconomic issues; 3) changes in anti-establishment profile; and 4) 
changes with respect to an extremist reputation (Akkerman et al. p. 268). 
The case analysis will build on the AfD policy positions from 2013 to 2017 as 2017 is the 
year when the 2017 German Federal Election took place. The challenging issue with this task 
lies in identifying the AfD positions at different times considering the continuous party shift 
in orientation and positions as well as the changes that had taken place within the party which 
also imply that the party programmes have been avoided when it was politically inappropriate 
by the AfD. As an effort to overcome this challenge and considering that the AfD 
programmatic profile, positions, and political behavior have developed through different 
stages, these stages will best be dived into three time periods, namely: (1) the formation 
period until the federal election in 2013; (2) the emergence of disputes within the party until 
the European Parliament (EP) election in 2014; (3) the end of the 2014 election until the 2017 
German federal election. To assess the development of an anti-establishment profile, 
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however, it might be necessary to extend the period of examination of the AfD to late 2017 
to evaluate whether the party respects or challenges the rules of the game as this is the period 
when the AfD entered the Bundestag. 
 
2.3 Data collection methods 
To answer the research questions this study builds on existing literature and a wide range 
sources of data such as electoral manifestos, party documentation, newspaper interviews, 
news information, an earlier (2017) research on the social media (focused on the AfD 
representatives), statements given by the party representatives, expert surveys (Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey) and the Comparative Manifesto Project.  
Firstly, besides being a rich source of information for my analysis the election manifestos 
and party documentation have been chosen for two other reasons: 1) they are authoritative 
documents that party leaders can only depart from with great difficulty (Michael Laver; John 
Garry, 2000), 2) they are reasonably comparable across cases and over time (Robert 
Klemmensen; Sara Binzer Hobolt; Martin Ejnar Hansen, 2007). The official documents of 
the AfD on which I will rely on are the following: 
1. The AfD Political Guidelines 2014 (Politische Leitlinien der Alternative für Deutschland). 
3. European Parliament Election manifesto 2014 (Mut zu Deutschland. Für ein Europa der 
Vielfalt). 
4. German federal election manifesto 2017 (PROGRAMM für Deutschland).  
Three of the sources mentioned above are translated into English, and the last one (2017) can 
easily be accessed via the AfD official website. The two other sources which have been 
removed from the official AfD webpage and can be found on the website of Hugh Bronson 
who has been a member of the AfD since 2016 (https://hughbronson.de/). 
Secondly, newspaper interviews, news information and statements given by the party 
representatives are going to be used to evaluate the changes in the agenda and positions in 
public debates and different regions within Germany, and to find which goals (vote-seeking, 
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office-seeking and policy-seeking) the AfD prioritizes and the strategies that it pursues (the 
goals and strategies have not been constant over time nor across all Germany as some have 
been more prominent in eastern Germany). Furthermore, the analysis of some of the 
statements given by the party representatives and a previously conducted research of the 
social media in 2017 will mirror the unique aspects of the party, including the various 
positions that are held by different party leaders throughout the period that this case will 
examine as well as the party factionalism.  
Moreover, to measure the positions of the AfD on the core issues and policy positions from 
2014 and 2017 and to investigate the trend in the AfD positions I will use the expert surveys 
as well which have been praised for three main reasons: 1) they hold  “a certain weight and 
legitimacy”, 2) give a timely account of a party’s position, are ‘quick, easy, and 
comprehensive’ and 3) generate ‘highly comparable and standardized data’(Cited in 
Akkerman et al. p 33).  
For this thesis, the most important expert survey is the one conducted by Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (CHES) which covers political parties in 31 countries. The CHES expert survey asks 
political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration (Polk et al. 2017). 
The dataset itself supplies the data on the positioning of the AfD on political ideology, 
European integration, and policy dimensions such as multiculturalism and immigration. 
Regarding policy issues, the 2017 survey focuses on the key questions facing Europe in 2017 
such as EU economic coordination, populism, and migration. The data are available and 
obtainable at https://www.chesdata.eu/ches-stats. One way to measure the reliability of the 
AfD’s positions on core issues which are going to be applied is by checking the deviations 
among experts, and that task will be carried out as well.  
Also, the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) database will be used to analyze the salience 
that the AfD attached to particular issues and to gauge how important socioeconomic issues 
are for the AfD. CMP is a project that measures how often parties mention a specific issue in 
their manifestos rather than the positions they take on these issues (Akerman et al. p. 36). It 
is assumed that a party gives attention to some issues and excludes some other. Thus, more 
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attention to some issues and neglection on others take place regardless of the party position 
on the issue. 
 
2.4 Framework for data analysis 
As mentioned earlier, to measure whether the AfD has moved towards the mainstream, three 
dimensions that derive from the theoretical framework will be used, namely: (1) radical party, 
(2) niche party and (3) anti-establishment party with an extreme right reputation (Table 1). 
These dimensions include the extent to which the AfD can be qualified as a radical, niche or 
anti-establishment party and the extent to which the AfD has an extreme reputation. Different 
from mainstream parties, radical right-wing populist parties have (1) programmatic profiles 
that are non-centrist, (2) programmatic profiles that evolve around sociocultural rather than 
socioeconomic issues and (3) an anti-establishment outlook on politics (Akkerman et al. 
2016).  
First, radical right-wing populist parties take radical, non-centrist positions on issues that are 
central to their ideology such as European integration, immigration, integration, law, and 
order (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 7). The first dimension of mainstreaming requires an 
assessment of the AfD positions on the issues above. To measure these positions of the AfD 
over time, election manifestos and other party documents such as political guidelines as well 
as expert surveys will be used. Fortunately, the CHES data set includes the AfD, and it holds 
information about changes in the positions of the party in the last two electoral cycles.  
Second, radical right-wing populist parties are niche parties because they primarily campaign 
on issues that do not belong to the traditional, socioeconomic left-right dimension. If the 
radical right had stayed put or moderated their positions, this party family would be losing 
its niche status (Wagner & M Meyer, 2017, p.7). The second dimension of mainstreaming 
focuses on the changes in the niche character of the AfD. The goal is to assess whether the 
policy agenda of the AfD has emphasized sociocultural issues or whether it has increasingly 
focused on socioeconomic issues as well. The salience of socioeconomic and sociocultural 
issues will be assessed through the framework of the Comparative Manifesto Database. In 
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line with the theoretical framework, a distinction will be made between the traditional 
socioeconomic dimension and the newer sociocultural dimension (Akkerman et al. p. 37). 
The first category includes issues such as market regulation, economic planning, corporatism, 
welfare state expansion and nationalization (401 to 414 and 504 to 507 in CMP codebook). 
The second category includes issues such as the national way of life, traditional morality, law 
and order and multiculturalism (601 to 608 in CMP codebook). In summary, all of the sources 
above of data will be used to look for evidence that moderation has taken place in any of the 
dimensions of the non-mainstreamness outlined in the theoretical framework.  
Third, radical right-wing populist parties are characterized by their disloyalty to the political 
establishment, and their behavior challenges the rules of the game in many ways, media 
included. They have transformative aspirations regarding not only policies but also 
metapolitics, i.e., the formal and informal rules of the game (Akkerman et al. 2016, p.8).  
Ultimately, the party's reputation should also be taken into consideration. The move away 
from classic extreme right subjects such as anti-Semitism, racism, and references to Nazism 
or fascism, which started in the late 1980s in some of the older radical right-wing populist 
parties, is not yet a closed chapter for all of them (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 8).  
 
Florian Hartleb (2015) finds that the following criteria are common to all types of anti-
establishment party and as such will further facilitate the process of assessing this dimension 
on the case of the AfD:  
 
“• the doctrine that ‘there is an alternative’;  
• the construction of a homogenous people (one people’s common interests in the sense of a 
volonte´ general) and a front line against the political elites and the mainstream parties; 
 • the image of an underdog, perpetuating the myth that they are excluded from the 
establishment, including the media;  
• the label of an opposition party (on current issues and in the format of representative 
democracy, but not necessarily against the democratic system itself);  
• the claim to be an unconventional political party (e.g. an anti-party party, a movement, a 
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leadership-based party, a party of real participation, etc.);  
• the demand for forms of direct democracy (referenda, etc.); 
 • the promise to clean up ‘dirty politics’ (with slogans such as ‘we know the truth’) and fight 
against corruption and clientelism;  
• the simplification or trivialisation of political issues;  
• the claim to advocate on behalf of the ‘silent majority’; 
 • a cynical approach to politics (attacking either the morality or competence of the 
establishment);  
• the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim of polarising the political discourse (on both 
issues and structural-based matters);  
• an aggressive attitude towards political adversaries (conflict instead of consensus); and  
• the formulation of a clear message (ideologically or pragmatically driven).” 
                                                                                                        (Hartleb, 2015, pp. 43-44)                                                                                                                 
 
The examination of goals and strategies enables us to see whether the AfD successfully 
developed and used strategies to either maximize their votes, seek the office, or pursue 
policies (the goals and strategies not been constant over time (nor across all Germany as some 
have been more prominent in Eastern Germany). The analysis of the election results of the 
2013 and the 2017 federal elections allows us to see whether the outcomes lead to a decrease 
in the opportunities for office, internal developments, and how this affected the shifting of 
the party. 
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Table 1. Dimensions of mainstreaming (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 10). Edited by the author.  
 
 
2.5 Limitations and potential problems  
There are limitations to this research, starting with the concept of ‘mainstreaming’ which will 
be uniquely measured from the perspective of the radical party moving toward the 
mainstream and not at the mainstream parties moving to the radical end. The drawback of 
this approach is that the movement of the other parties will not be analyzed in order to assess 
how the AfD is affecting the entire party system in Germany.  
Due to limited resources, the interviews of the AfD leadership have not taken as much 
attention as they deserve in order to assess better the impact that different approaches have 
had in the development of the party.  
The researcher is not a native German, and his comprehension in German is not sufficient 
enough to analyze the texts which are in German independently. The author has tried to focus 
more on materials that are accessible in English and has partially relied on the contribution 
of German-speaking colleagues which in turn means that it cannot be guaranteed that no 
mistakes on interpreting have been made on this research.  
Dimensions of non-
mainstreamness  
Evidenced by  Indicators for mainstreaming  
Radical party  Core positions are radical  Core positions are moderated  
Niche Party  1) Issue agenda is limited 
2) Sociocultural issues are emphasized  
Issue agenda is expanded, and socioeconomic 
issues are emphasized more strongly  
Anti-establishment party  1) Anti-establishment positions  
2) Rules of the game are challenged  
Anti-establishment positions are moderated  
Rules of the game are respected  
Extreme right reputation 1) Anti-Semitic/racist Expressions  
2) Ties with extremists  
Anti-Semitic/racist expressions are suppressed  
Ties with extremists are severed 
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3. THE GERMAN PARTY-SYSTEM: A POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
OVERVIEW 
 
3.1 German party system  
Germany has a multi-party system which has been dominated by two major political parties 
in the last five decades, the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party. The 
coalitions to form the government have been frequent in Federal Germany. Currently, there 
are six major political parties in Germany which are also represented in the German 
Parliament, namely, Christian Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party of Germany, the 
Green Party, Free Democratic Party, The Left Party, and the newcomer the AfD. The 
chancellor who is the leader of the executive branch in the country is chosen by the elected 
representatives in the German Parliament.  
Since 1949 the West Germany parliamentary system has been well institutionalized. 
Different from earlier federal parliaments in the past, the Bundestag has not only endured but 
also enjoyed growing popular support (Frankland, 1989, p. 393). In the mid-1970s, the 
‘model Germany’ seemed to have reached perfection (Poguntke, 2012, p. 951). 
First, there was the economic factor. Considering that the German economy started almost 
from scratch after the Second World War and in the mid-1970s the economic development 
in Western Germany was getting better and stronger. Secondly, a country which before and 
during the Second World War was ruled by the Nazi Party seemed to have reached a stage 
where it was turned into a model of stable party democracy (Poguntke, 2012, p. 951). This 
stage of stable party democracy was manifested in a very high voters turnout reaching up to 
91.1 percent of the electorate in 1972 (Poguntke, 2012). The high support for the political 
parties also meant that there was no space left for possible radical voices that were not in line 
with the mainstream parties in Western Germany and that the German voters in West 
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Germany were supporting the way the country was governed. Being that there were two 
major parties almost equal in size, the government change was possible. However, Helmut 
Kohl’s 16-year tenure in the office, which marked him out as the longest-serving of all 
German Chancellors since Otto Von Bismarck indicates that the party system lost some of 
its balance by the 1980s (Poguntke, 2012, p. 151). In contrast to what Poguntke (2012) 
qualifies as a ‘perfection stage’ of West Germany, there are other scholars such as Otto 
Kirchheimer (1966), Wolf-Dieter Narr (1977) and Hermann Scheer (1979) that claim the 
opposite for early stages of German party system, saying that Bonn was doomed to become 
‘Weimar’, pointing out the issues of vanishing opposition, lack of ideological differences 
between the political parties, and the highly criticized the one-party state.  
Although the two main traditional parties in Germany still enjoy high scores, the newcomers 
have left their mark on the German party system. A notable example is that of the Green 
Party. The Greens first started as an organized movement against the expansions of nuclear 
power, an act which laid the foundation for the establishment of the political party itself. 
Poguntke (2012) argues that with the advent of the Greens, the West German party system 
lost its balance and the Greens did not become an acceptable partner of the national 
government until the end of the 1980s (Poguntke, 2012, p. 953). The emergence of the Greens 
and their success in 1983 marked a new beginning for the West German party system.  
 
The criticism which was earlier on directed towards the government, leading political parties 
and the party system were falling, mainly because the Green Party proved that the 
representation is possible for the newcomers that have different strategies, agendas and 
methods from those of the traditional parties. With that said, the Germany party system has 
had a succession of both good and bad experiences but has generally been quite successful 
in enabling Germany to shift towards a stable democracy as well as allowing and facilitating 
the emergence of the new parties later on. The importance of the German party system and 
its slow development only increases when considering that only a few contemporaries would 
have ventured the prediction that the German party system would fulfill what was then 
considered its most important and imminent functions: government formation, government 
 
 
38 
 
stability and, somewhat later, government alternation (cited in Poguntke, 2001, p. 4). 
 
3.2 Populist legacy in Germany  
The rise of the new radical-wing parties is a phenomenon that draws attention anywhere in 
Europe, but it is especially remarkable in the case of Germany because of the historical legacy 
of the Nazism. For instance, Germany has minimal experience with successful right-wing 
populist parties with steady electorate support at the national level. According to Karsten 
Grabow (2016), attempts to establish right-wing populist parties in Germany in the past were 
either locally or temporarily restricted or resulted in failure because of the resistance from 
the established democratic forces, including the media (p. 174). These parties have had many 
difficulties, and one of them was often the failure to set boundaries and detach themselves 
from the extremists in Germany.  
 
The relevance of the ability to show detachment only increases when considering how the 
German government, political parties, and people have struggled for more than a half of a 
century to redefine their identity (Williams, 2016, p. 115). Precisely because of the Nazi past 
and the Second World War the German government has been prudent in referring to Germany 
as a Fatherland in the classic meaning of the term. However, Helmut Kohl the Chancellor of 
Germany made efforts to move forward from the past and to restore German national identity 
in 1982. This became known as the German Wende or renewal (Williams, 2016, p. 115). 
Although decades have passed since then, it does not mean that the political parties or 
movements in Germany have no constraints when it comes to the language they use to 
express themselves, the way they behave, and the goals that they pursue, as the German 
government has put a lot of effort into showing its commitment to democracy and to 
neutralize perils that threaten the German democratic order to prevent Nazi elements from 
returning to power in Germany. Article 21 of the German Basic Law is an excellent example 
of these efforts.  
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3.2.1 Article 21 of the German Basic Law 
A brief examination of the German legal framework is useful in that it sets in context how 
legal norms can affect upon and shape the agendas as well as the patterns of engagement 
among political parties, especially the AfD.  
Section 1 of Article 21 of the German Basic Law which refers to the political parties’ states 
that:  
          “Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. 
They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic 
principles. They must publicly account for their assets and the sources and use of their funds.”     
                         
                                            (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2018, p. 21). 
Here it is clearly stated that the internal organization of a political party must conform to 
democratic principles. Furthermore, in the second section of Article 21 that is directly related 
to the legacy of Nazim in Germany it becomes even more specific as it bans antidemocratic 
political parties' function in Germany: 
               “Parties that, because of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to 
undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court 
shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.” 
                                              (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2018, p. 21). 
These provisions are crucial as they represent institutional constrictions for the functioning 
and purposes of the radical right-wing parties in Germany which in turn imposes limitations 
on the right-wing parties’ freedom of expression. In other words, if a political party or 
movement threatens the current German order or gets ‘out of the line,’ then the banning of 
that party or movement can take place. Furthermore, the provisions in the German Basic Law 
enable the Federal Office for the protection of the Constitution which was established mainly 
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to deal with Neo-Nazism and communist activities and which is currently responsible for the 
domestic security in Germany to investigate the activities of groups in Germany in order to 
determine their level of threat to the democratic order (Williams, 2016, p. 115). According 
to a research conducted by Angela K Bourne & Fernando Casal Bertoa (2017), there have 
been two cases where the German political parties have been banned as they have posed a 
threat to the free democratic basic order in Germany (Bértoa Casal & Bourne K., 2015). Two 
cases were excluded from the list, namely the far-right Free German Workers Party and 
National List because the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that these are associations 
(Bértoa Casal & Bourne K., 2015, p. 9). 
The first incident occurred in 1952 when the Socialist Reich Party was banned on the grounds 
of being a Nazi successor party as it openly expressed admiration for Hitler. What is more, 
one of their goals which were against the Basic Law was the idea of an exclusive blood 
community. The primary goal of the Socialist Reich Party was to continue what Hitler had 
started with his idea of social revolution (cited in Williams, 2016, p. 116)). In 1951, the party 
won 16 seats in the Lower Saxony assembly election, getting 11 percent of the votes. 
Following the outcome of the elections, Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of West Germany 
at the time whom the Socialist Reich party leaders believed to be a puppet of the Americans, 
initiated the banning process of the party through the Constitutional Court. The party was 
formally banned in 1952. 
The second case was that of the Communist Party of Germany (extreme left party) which 
was banned in 1956 by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the grounds that it 
used aggressive methods to achieve their political aims. Recently, in 2017, the Article 21 has 
been invoked against the extreme-right National Democratic Party of Germany, but the 
outcome was not successful as the Federal Constitutional court decided that although the 
political party was racist, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic and xenophobic, it was not a severe 
threat to the German Democracy, as: 
                  “It had a limited electoral showing during its five decades of existence. It was 
unable to assume leadership of the broader neo-Nazi movement, and it was not clear the 
 
 
41 
 
party as such was involved in the far-right’s many acts of intimidation against asylum seekers, 
minorities and political opponents in recent decades.” 
                                                                                               (Bourne & Bértoa Casal, 2017).
  
Article 21 of the German Basic Law is important as it means that if the AfD would act 
improperly towards the German order that is not allowed by the Article, then the procedures 
for the ban of the party can be initiated as well. Although some mainstream politicians have 
voiced their concerns regarding the AfD, there have been no strong or cogent reasons for 
banning the party so far. 
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4.      CASE STUDY FINDINGS: DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS, AND SYNTHESIS  
The first step of retrieving empirical data for this research is based on a case study, and 
different sources have been used and processed altogether in order to allow an analysis of the 
issues raised in a set context. To measure whether the AfD has moved towards the 
mainstream the research focuses on four dimensions of mainstreaming outlined in the 
methodological framework chapter: (1) changes with respect to radical positions on core 
issues such as immigration, European integration, law and order (2) changes from a niche 
party to a party that emphasizes sociocultural but it has increasingly focused on 
socioeconomic issues as well; (3) changes in their anti-establishment profile; (4) changes 
with respect to an extremist reputation. It is in the context of these developments in which 
the context of this study is implemented.  
 
4.1      The Development of the AfD 
The AfD has become phenomenally successful and the significance of the party's success 
continues to increase despite several reasons such as the history of Germany, the fact that the 
AfD has entered the German political landscape as the largest opposition grouping in the 
Bundestag, and that both the mainstream political parties and media have had a strong 
disinclination and dislike towards radical right-wing parties; the latter was manifested by 
keeping the radical-right wing parties out of the German parliament for decades. This 
situation, however, proved to be a more delicate matter as neither the CDU/CSU nor SPD 
(with the majority of the votes in the 2017 elections) found AfD to be a favorable coalition 
partner (Lees, 2018, p. 296).  
The party was initially established in April 2013 by German conservatives as a single-issue 
party which criticized the centrist policies and federal government, not to mention the 
Bundestag parties and their stance on the Euro crisis. The viewpoints of the AfD in the midst 
(of the aftermath) of several European crises (Lees, 2018, pp. 299-300) shaped its public 
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image, and it became to be identified with a group of disaffected CDU members including 
Konrad Adam, Alexander Gauland and Berndt Lucke (born 1962) who earlier on in 
September 2012 founded a political action group called ‘Wahlalternative 2013’ (an electoral 
alternative for the 2013 General election) which marked the early emergence of and laid the 
foundation for AfD itself (Arzheimer, 2015, p. 8). Wahlalternative was a pressure group that 
supported the ‘Federation of Independent,’ a fledgling umbrella organization for community-
based voter associations that are often dominated by the owners of a small local business 
(Arzheimer, 2015, pp. 8-9). Although Germany is seen as the largest benefiter of the EU and 
the Euro Zone, the leaders of Wahlalternative were making claims such as “The Federal 
Republic of Germany is in the worst crisis of its history" or "democracy is degrading," 
(Gründungsaufruf Wahlalternative, 2013).  
The Wahlalternative manifesto (Gründungsaufruf Wahlalternative 2013) which now can be 
accessed only in web.archive.org as a reminder of their failure had three objectives. First, 
they demanded that Germany should no longer support the debts of other countries (Wählen 
Sie die Alternative!, 2013). Second, that Germany should withdraw from the monetary union, 
and all other countries should be free to abandon Eurozone, restore their national currencies, 
or to merge into more suitable currency unions (Wählen Sie die Alternative!, 2013). Third, 
that any issue regarding the transfer of sovereignty of Germany in supranational bodies 
should require a prior referendum (Wählen Sie die Alternative!, 2013). 
The failure of the “Wahlalternative 2013” together with “Federation of Independent Voters” 
to get more than 1% in the state election in Lower Saxony where 5% is the threshold for 
parliamentary representation and the conflicting views on organization and strategy 
(Lewandowsky, 2014, p. 2) lead to the emergence of the AfD. Enlisting the solid support of 
different economists, business leaders, activists, and journalists, the AfD officially discussed 
and approved its leadership board and party program in Berlin for the first time since its 
inception in 2013 (Lees, 2018, pp. 300, 301). Konrad Adam and Bernd Lucke, together with 
the Frauke Petry were the leaders of the newest party in Germany (Lewandowsky, 2014).  
Throughout becoming visible in the German political landscape since its first congress, the 
party relied on the Länder parties and the general attitudes towards Euroscepticism as a 
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driving force for attracting possible voters (Lees, 2018, p. 301). As will be later elaborated 
but Lees mentions (Lees, 2018, p. 304) at first the AfD did not entirely conform to the 
orthodox template of a radical right-wing populist party but had populist tendencies that were 
designed to suit the needs of the nation instead. As a result, for instance, the 2014 manifesto 
for the EP election, which could also be considered as a manifesto of the party's contemporary 
contradictory nature, emphasized ordoliberalism and social market in contrast to the anti-
Euro discourse of the party (Lees, 2018, p. 306). The same could be said about the political 
guidelines of the AfD in 2014 which will be analyzed later. 
Nonetheless, in 2013 the AfD failed to enter the Bundestag getting only 4.7% of the electorate 
vote in a country where the threshold is 5%. Despite not securing a position in the parliament, 
the defeat was considered an achievement, and therefore the AfD became the most successful 
emerging party in Germany (Jankowski, Schneider, & Tepe, 2016, p. 704). 
There was a surge in popularity after 2013 (Lees, 2018, p. 301). In 2014, the grouping was 
able to secure positions (MEPs) in the EP, “albeit on a split vote” (Lees, 2018, p. 301). This 
coincided well with the European migration crisis offering the AfD an even more suitable 
platform to become more radicalized as well as generally heard in state parliament elections 
throughout Germany (Lees, 2018, pp. 301, 307). The party's primary focus shifted now 
towards immigration instead of the Euro crisis, and its abolition which was a suitable 
stratagem as Merkel’s open-door policy was not popular among her core electorate (Lees, 
2018, pp. 300-301).   
Up until 2015, the criticism of the party came mainly from the moderate economists who 
used the language of populism for their agenda  (Lees, 2018, p. 305). The conservatives and 
nationalists were peripheral (Lees, 2018, p. 305). This changed in 2015 when the AfD started 
to develop a more orthodox right-wing populist approach in the German political scene as a 
whole (Lees, 2018, p. 305). The changes in the program were caused by the changes in 
leadership since Berndt Lucke who was economically liberal was replaced by the far more 
conservative Frauke Petry in 2015 (Lees, 2018, p. 305). As mentioned above, her critique of 
the open-door policy of 2015 and 2016 received a generally positive welcome from the 
voters, and therefore the party was also acknowledged in state parliament elections (Lees, 
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2018, p. 305). Under the rule of Petry, the AfD intensified its program by taking into account 
the already previously apparent non-elite position on the Eurozone (Lees, 2018, pp. 305–
306). 
Moreover, Petry laid strong emphasis on the pre-eminence and importance of the German 
culture as well as the rejection of Islam within the German society (Lees, 2018, p. 306). In 
2017, Petry resigned, and the AfD presented Alice Weidel and Alexander Gauland as their 
new leading spokespeople. The party becomes to be associated with neo-Nazis, and extreme 
radicalism as its power was now concentrated in the hands of more extreme nationalists 
(Lees, 2018, p. 305).  
 
4.2      AfD’s electoral performance in 2013 
In the first phase, the AfD had to compete in the German Federal Election of 2013 to get 
elected into Bundestag in September 2013. While the party missed only by a small margin, 
it was enough to secure them state funding which would, in turn, contributed to the further 
enlargement and development of the AfD (Arzheimer, 2015, p. 9). In 2013, the AfD was 
referred to as the ‘anti-euro’ party and was merged with economic liberals and conservatives. 
It was known as the ‘anti-euro’ party mainly because it adhered to the demands initially put 
forward by Wahlalternative where the main issue was economical, specifically the 
dissolution of the 17-member eurozone currency union (Bleiker, 2017).  
The general success of the AfD in the 2013 election was mainly because of the dissatisfaction 
with the way the German government dealt with the eurozone crisis. Furthermore, it adopted 
political stances on the European project and the Eurozone and role of Germany as its driving 
force (Lees, 2018, p. 299). In 2012, as reported by Germany's public international broadcaster 
Deutsche Welle (DW) in a survey conducted by Der Spiegel, a high percentage (54%) of the 
interviewed said that continuing to add billions to euro rescue packages by Germany did not 
make any sense (Bleiker, 2017). Konrad Adam, the founding member of the AfD, saw this 
dissatisfaction as the source of the votes for his party as people were looking for other 
alternatives to the crisis since the mainstream parties were all taking the same stances towards 
this critical situation, and the only difference that they had was in how much money they 
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wanted to give out (Bleiker, 2017).  
In other words, there is a gap which must be filled as on the one hand as shown by the survey 
there are different opinions about the issue of the euro among the people, and on the other 
hand, there is only one opinion among the mainstream parties represented in the parliament. 
Firstly, although the core single-issue was enough for the AfD to perform well in the public 
eye, it is apparent that being more successful as a party in Germany in the long term requires 
a fully developed party platform, broader scope and a more fundamental approach, since 
without these requirements it is almost impossible to pass the 5 % threshold alone. Secondly, 
the single-issue parties face one main challenge; the issue gets fixed and fades away as a 
problem. Looking at the current situation in Europe and Germany, that has proved to be the 
case.  
4.3      AfD’s electoral performance in 2017 
The 2017 election saw the breakthrough of a populist party in the German parliament. The 
AfD received 12.6% of the vote and 94 seats with a voter turnout of 76.2%. The success of 
the party is directly related to the previous success of the 2013 elections, and the first 
condition that has facilitated the breakthrough of the AfD relates to changes that have taken 
place within the party goals, strategies, and discourse while keeping in mind the 
disappointment of the electorate with the mainstream parties. Especially with the decision of 
Chancellor Merkel in 2015 to open Germany borders for refuges (Lichfield, 2015).  
 
The key to the AfD’s significant growth lies in its exceptional transformation and the general 
fragility of the European Union (Lees, 2018, pp. 299-300). For instance, in a survey 
conducted by the German public broadcaster ZDF, although only 13 percent of the 
respondents believed that the AfD could solve the issue of the refugee crisis, 44 percent of 
respondents said that the refuges and foreigners are one of the biggest problems facing 
Germany (Blickle et al., 2017). A crucial element that contributed to the success of the AfD 
was due to the ability of the party to “mobilize previous non-voters to turn out” (Hoerner & 
Hobolt, 2017). The AfD got more votes than the Greens and the Left Party to become the 
third largest party in the German Parliament with 94 seats, while the conservatives and 
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center-left suffered losses, the AfD because of Saxony's most powerful party (Blickle et al. 
2017).  
Data from Infratest dimap for ARD show that 1,470,000 non-voters cast their vote for the 
AfD, making up to 25% of the voter migration flow for the party, 130,000 (2.2%) of which 
were first-time voters. Also, around 1,040,000 (18%) voters who in the past have voted for 
CDU/CSU have decided to support the AfD. Continuing further with 510,000 (8.6%) of 
voters from SPD, 420,000 (7.1%) of votes were lost by the Left Party. Furthermore, as shown 
by a study published by the Federal Returning Officer on the 2017 Bundestag Election, most 
AfD voters come from 35-44 (16%) and the 45-to-59 age groups (15%), whereas age groups 
with 70 and more and 18-24 supported the AfD with 8% of the votes. More than half of the 
AfD voters were aged from 45 and 69 years old, meaning that the youngest and the oldest 
age group were underrepresented (“2017 Bundestag Election: more vote splitting than ever,” 
STATIS, 2018).  
 
Table 3. Data retrieved from The Federal Returning Officer 2017. Created by the author. 
When it comes to voting behavior by education, the highest percentage of AfD voters comes 
from people that have a school-leaving certificate from an intermediate-level high school (17 
percent), followed by the second group made up with voters who completed vocational high 
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school with 14 percent (Blickle et al. 2017). On the other hand, only 7 percent of university 
graduates voted for the AfD, making it the lowest percentage of the voters' group when 
compared to four smaller parties that are represented at the German parliament. Whereas the 
most significant share of the group that cast their vote for the AfD works (19 percent), with 
the second largest group being self-employed with 12 percent (Blickle et al. 2017) 
When looking at the voting behavior based on gender, the AfD supporters are mostly men 
and are situated in the eastern part of Germany. Women on the other hand although support 
the AfD less, the gap between west and east is quite high as well as in west AfD share of 
votes by women is just 8 percent compared to 17 percent in the east (Blickle et al. 2017). 
 
4.4      Different engagement strategies of the AfD in the western (more 'mainstream' 
populist) and in the eastern (more radical) parts of Germany 
 
As the AfD has occupied a crucial place in the new German political landscape, the division 
between the east and west has surfaced again. Joachim Gauck, the federal president of 
Germany, noted three years ago that the west was seen as the nation of compassion and 
tolerance and the east as the nation of hatred and racism (Richter, 2018). The conservative 
daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung asked: "Is Saxony still a part of Germany?" Der 
Spiegel put the word Saxony on its cover with big letters turning into brown, old-German 
type (translation: Nazi type) (Blickle et al. 2017). The AfD has supporters in the West as 
shown by the statistics. As reported by the German newspaper Handelsblatt, the AfD won 
20,5 percent of the vote in the Eastern German states, including the former East Berlin. 
In comparison, the AfD only got 10.7 percent in western Germany (Schaer, 2017). Table 
2 shows the performance of the AfD in the east and west sorted by individual states in the 
2013 and 2017 federal election. The performance of the AfD in 2017 in both parts of 
Germany is evident compared to the one in 2013, gaining more presence in the state 
parliaments as well. Also, in 2018 state elections in Bavaria, the AfD won 10,2 percent 
meaning that the party (has) entered the Bavarian state parliament for the first time.  
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Going back to the regional differences, it could be said that although there have been attempts 
to explain this phenomenon, often referring to the unequal distribution of wealth between the 
east and west, it is somewhat challenging to assess whether the AfD is supported more in the 
east because of the differences between the east and west, their positions on immigration or 
a combination of various factors such as the history, differences in wealth distribution and 
the strategies used by the political parties (especially the AfD).   
 
In addition, the number of foreigners that live in East Germany is much lower compared to 
the west where there are more migrants. In the east, migrants make up 4%-9% of the 
population, while in West Germany the number reaches up to 25% in many parts. However, 
the disinclination towards migrants in the eastern part is higher, and according to experts, 
one of the main reasons for that can be the lack of experience of living with foreigners 
(Connolly, 2015). This, in turn, is manifested through anger from East Germans about mass 
unemployment after unification, the perceived arrogance of the West German elites and the 
failure to bring wages and pensions in line with the West is redirected against refugees, 
migrants, and foreigners (“How the far-right AfD taps into Germany's East-West divide,” 
Deutsche Welle, 2018). The communist past of the eastern part is the cause for these 
differences that are manifested even today between east and west, and the AfD is using those 
cracks in the east to its advantage.  
 
For example, Björn Höcke (well known for his strong language) who is a history teacher and 
the leader of the AfD in the state of Thuringia prefers presenting himself as “the voice of the 
East” despite coming from western Germany. The former leader of the AfD Frauke Petry 
agrees: "Höcke is capitalizing on the dissatisfaction of citizens in the East without coming 
up with any proposals of his own, but in doing so he remains a non-specific projection screen 
for many of their wishes,"(“How the far-right AfD taps into Germany's East-West divide,” 
Deutsche Welle, 2018).  
 
Sylvia Sasse, a professor of Slavic Literature at the University of Zurich has written on her 
blog an article titled "Die Zombie-Republik. DDR reloaded." She claims that xenophobia 
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was constitutive for the GDR (Sasse, 2018). The devaluation of the others, including their 
brothers and sisters has served to hold the republic somehow together. In DDR the contact 
with foreigners, not only in the West has been observed by the secret service because they 
were regarded as possible dissidents (Sasse, 2018). These resentments against strangers are 
nowadays politically used in eastern Germany by the AfD. Sasse suspects that the anger that 
is expressed in the eastern part is essentially a new type of obedience, a new submission to 
the slogans of AfD instead of the submission to the old regime. The AfD in return interprets 
this new obedience as dissidence, a breakout from the mainstream (Sasse, 2018). 
  
In addition, Robert Grimm (2015) has found that the AfD has been increasingly adopting a 
xenophobic, nativist and law and order rhetoric in eastern Germany (Grimm, 2015). 
Furthermore, during the 2014 local election campaigns in 2014 in the Eastern German states 
of Brandenburg, Thuringia and notably Saxony, the AfD's electoral offerings included 
broader communitarian nativist themes (Grimm, 2015). The AfD Saxony used those rifts 
between the east and west to its advantage while it drew on widespread fears about 
uncontrolled migration, European ‘welfare tourism', bogus and criminal asylum seekers and 
trans-border crime, dual citizenship and demanded public referenda to decide on the building 
of mosques and minarets (Grimm, 2015). 
 
 
51 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage vote shares for the AfD in the Bundestag and state elections, by 
individual states, 2013–2017. Source: (Lees, 2018, p. 302) 
 
4.5      Clashes between hardliners and moderates, the strategy of the AfD and the impact 
on the electoral success of the party 
Recent research published by Simon T. Franzmann (2018) argues that the development of 
the AfD was mainly driven by the intra-party divisions and conflicts (Franzmann S. , 2018, 
p. 8). Since the party emergence in 2013 and until one day after the 2017 German elections 
when the leader Frauke Petry announced that she had resigned the party has experienced 
significant changes in leadership (Chazan, 2017). She followed the path of Bernd Lucke, in 
announcing plans to form a new right-wing populist party (Siri, 2017, p. 141). The decision 
of Frauke Petry to leave the AfD and form her party "The Blue Party" showed that what was 
perceived as a successful radical right-wing party from the outside was going through some 
internal struggles and that two or more different approaches within the party were taking 
place. In other words, there are two (or more) groups within the AfD, the moderate wing of 
the party on the one hand, and hardliners of the party on the other. Alexander Gauland and 
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Björn Höcke who belonged among the hardliners were more connected with extremists and 
focused more on the topics such as refugees and ‘Islam,’ Whereas Frauke Petry and her 
followers belonged to the former group which later wanted to distance the party from the 
radical right (even Petry’s position itself has shifted from the hardliner to moderate through 
time on specific issues). Hence, putting effort into making it possible for the party to be 
perceived as a potential coalition partner in the future by addressing more topics such as the 
EU and economic issues (Röhlig, 2017). However, as reported by Financial Times Germany, 
"the initiative was soundly rejected by the rest of the party," (Chazan, 2017).  
This was also confirmed by Petry itself when she justified her decision to leave the AfD by 
saying that extremist statements made by other party leaders make it impossible to construct 
a “constructive opposition,” (Chase, 2017). As reported by DW, one of the leaders of the 
party, Alice Weidel, said that everyone was surprised by her decision (Chase, 2017). 
However, looking further into this, there are reports which state that the clashes between 
these two groups within the party had been going on for some time, despite the comments of 
Weidel of being surprised by the decision. Petry's husband, Marcus Pretzel, also qualified as 
an influential AfD leader, quit the party and stated that his decision is based on his "not very 
optimistic view of how the AfD is likely to develop,” (Chase, 2017). Furthermore, in late 
February 2018, the AfD sued its former leader Frauke Petry on the basis that the name and 
color of the logo of her new party, the “Blue Party”, are extremely similar to that of the AfD, 
a milder way of expressing the AfD’s strong disapproval with Petry’s outright “copying’’ 
(Hölter, 2018). As a report by "Bento" reveals, in 2017 the AfD had registered several 
‘marken’ just to be on the safe side and prevent something like that from happening, 
including names such as "Blaue Partei" and "Blaue Wende", however, but not Die Blaue 
Partei which is the name that Petry's party has in German (Hölter, 2018).  
 
The changes that were caused by the internal party splits make it difficult to say whether the 
AfD has had a specific strategy. However, Franzmann (2018) claims that if there is one 
effective strategic center within the AfD, it is crystallized in the person of Alexander Gauland 
(Franzmann S. , 2018, p. 9). Different from Bernd Lucke, Gauland was not keen on 
 
 
53 
 
discussing the euro, but he changed his mind temporarily for tactical reasons (cited in 
Franzmann, 2018, p. 9). The ability of Gauland to adapt and act strategically made him one 
of the most respected and influential people within the party and this has been decisive in the 
internal battles of 2015 and 2017 (Franzmann, 2018, p. 9). The strategic ability of the AfD 
to shift its focus from criticizing the European Stability Mechanism to an anti-modernization 
and anti-migration agenda is directly related to Gauland’s influence within the party and his 
cultural conservatism and nationalism (Franzmann, 2018, p. 9).  
Although the AfD development has been characterized by party splits and internal struggles, 
Franzmann argues that the electoral success of the party has remained unharmed for two main 
reasons. First, the splits were beneficial in the formation of crucial issues and shaping of the 
programmatic profile of the AfD (Franzmann. 2018, p. 11.) Second, the internal party splits 
fell into a period without any Länder elections which in return meant that the AfD had months 
to re-organize and overcome the internal issues (Franzmann, 2018, p.11 -12.) 
 
4.6      The AfD 2014 political guidelines and moving away from the single issue 
In April 2013, Bernd Lucke gave a speech during the AfD’s conference in Berlin in which 
he stated that he does not view the AfD as a single-issue party, a statement that ran counter 
to the beliefs of the scholars and media at the time who claimed that the AfD was one. 
Nevertheless, changes were necessary after the initial success in the 2013 federal elections 
in order to guarantee the party’s long-term presence in the German political landscape. In the 
2014 political guidelines, the attempt to shift from a single issue to a broader spectrum of 
issues by the AfD becomes apparent. Furthermore, Simon T- Franzman (2016) researched 
the tactical agendas of the AfD which revealed that before the 2014 EP elections the AfD 
acted as a single-issue party whose degrees of populism varied in public (Franzmann, 2014). 
However, as the 2014 European Elections were approaching, the AfD decreased its use of 
populist appeals (Franzmann, 2014, p. 473).  
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A brief description followed by an analysis of the AfD’s 2014 political guidelines and their 
approach towards immigration, the European Union and other socioeconomic and 
sociocultural issues will be provided below.  
The Alternative for Germany starts its political guidelines (Politische Leitlinien der AfD 
2014) by giving a short historical description of the "extremely successful" phase in the 
German history after the Second World War in social, political, and economic developments. 
At the same time, they point out the reasons why that specific phase was "extremely 
successful" and why the lack of those factors nowadays makes Germany surrounded with 
problems and adverse trends. They proceed by giving their solutions about those issues, as a 
way of saying that they have the efficient and reliable means to bring Germany to an 
‘extremely successful’ phase again. As it is to be expected, a large part of the political 
guidelines refers to the European Union and the euro crisis. For instance, on this issue, the 
AfD reinforced their position on how the euro has been harmful and emphasized the perils 
that come from it: 
 “The euro crisis has shown that the introduction of the euro was a decision 
economically and politically contrary to reason. It has long been evident that the single-
currency euro destroyed Europe's foundation. It generates strife and resurrects national 
prejudices. Welfare and peace among the member states in the eurozone are endangered.”                                         
                                       (Political Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland, 2014, p. 2).  
 The party believed that the decision for a single-currency was economically and politically 
contrary to reason. However, statistics suggest something else, as Germany is the main 
economic benefactor from single-currency in the entire European Union where, after a brief 
contraction in 2008, the German economy continued to grow (Grimm, 2015, pp. 265-266). 
Hypothetically speaking, if Germany would get out of Eurozone only because a euro crisis 
occurred once, one could argue that precisely that decision would be economically and 
politically contrary to reason.  
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The AfD argues that democracy has suffered harm in the euro crisis because parliaments of 
the states did not have a say in financial burdens caused by the European Stability Mechanism 
and that the rule of law has also suffered harm in the euro crisis because violations on two 
levels were committed from national governments and from European Central Bank itself 
(Political Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland, 2014, p. 2). The first has violated 
the Maastricht Treaty and the latter the prohibition of monetary state financing. The 
separation of powers has also come to harm because during the euro crisis the Federal 
Constitutional Court failed to denounce "obvious" legal violations made by the federal 
government and skipped its responsibility by appealing to European Court of Justice for the 
first time (Political Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland, 2014, p. 2). 
 
 Moreover, the AfD claims that their main aim is to preserve, and where necessary, to restore 
the democracy and the fundamental principles of it. They want to bring back the principles 
that were violated by the German government during the euro crisis, the principle of 
responsibility, the principle of solidarity, the principle of transparency and the principle of 
sustainability (Political Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland, 2014, p. 2).  
Quite an interesting approach can be noticed when talking about the equality of the sexes and 
gender quotas. They strive for the former while rejecting the latter together with the policies 
that aim to abolish sexual identity. For them, personal achievements and abilities must be the 
determining factors as “the AfD believes in equal opportunity, not equal results” (Political 
Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland, 2014, p. 2).  
 When addressing their views on the freedom of opinion and speech, it is evident that they 
value the open debate as one of the most important public goods, yet they will also make sure 
that the “freedom of expression also includes the right to criticize religion” (Political 
Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland, 2014, p. 2). 
 
When expressing their views on population development on Germany, the AfD presents itself 
as a conservative party as it wants to encourage young people to establish families. Their 
approach to same-sex marriage remains a little bit unclear even though they claim that the 
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marriage between a man and a woman is ‘desirable.’ When it comes to demographic 
sustainability, they also favor the immigration to Germany of "those who are willing and able 
to integrate themselves into [the German] society." On the other hand, the “The AfD firmly 
rejects immigration into the German social systems — also from EU member countries” 
(Political Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland, 2014, p. 2).  
The program of the AfD for the election to the 2014 EP election is especially useful in order 
to get a clearer understanding of the party positions. In the preamble, it is stated that: 
 “The AfD strives for an EU of sovereign states supporting human rights, democracy, 
the values of the Christian West, selective integration, subsidiarity, competition, and the rule 
of law. It is against excessive EU centralism, bureaucracy, dirigisme and a common currency 
that leads to rescuing incompetent banks, to frustrated jobless young people and minimal 
pensions.” 
                                       (Courage to Stand Up for Germany - For European Diversity, 2014).  
 The concept of the "Christian West" remains very problematic because one might argue that 
there is no Christian West. There might be a Western Europe influenced by Christianity, but 
again, there is no uniformity on that. As Andrea Althoff (2018) finds: 
 
 “The most direct connection between right-wing populism and conservative 
Christianity is the AfD’s reference to the Christian tradition as the main ingredient of German 
culture. This German culture and Christianity are, for the AfD, under threat by Muslim 
immigrants and refugees and needs to be protected.” 
                                                                                                               (Althoff, 2018, p. 24). 
 
The ‘selective integration’ part stands out as well. Based on the fourth point of the program, 
it is Turkey and its aspirations to join EU. For which they clearly state that EU accession 
negotiations with Turkey are to be stopped (Courage to Stand Up for Germany. For European 
Diversity, 2014, p. 2). Furthermore, the AfD gives a very dark image of the European Union 
and claims that there must be an alternative, their alternative! The AfD continues by pointing 
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out how the elites are lying the citizens of the euro zone. Therefore the AfD wants to remove 
“the smokescreen” and reveal the “truth.” On the issue of the European Union itself the AfD 
claims that it has no intentions to change the commitment of Germany towards the European 
Union. Instead, the AfD wants to strengthen the role of Germany in the European Union.  
In addition, a distinction must be made between the manifestos and the language that is used 
in public debates, traditional media outlets, and social media. For instance, Charles Lee 
(2018) argues that the AfD’s stance on immigration had always been hardline, a position that 
was openly made clear via social media outlets and election posters (Lees, 2018, p. 306). 
Frauke Petry who had become the leading spokesperson of the AfD in 2015 was strongly 
opposed to Merkel’s plan, and the populist direction that she took, including the idea of 
identity checks at the German border, proved to be successful among the electorate (Lees, 
2018, pp. 305-306).  
Considering that the AfD used populist discourse in 2013 on the one hand and on the other 
seeing the not so strong language used in their political guidelines in 2014, the more moderate 
guidelines would only hide this populist attitude (Franzmann, 2014, p. 474). The analysis of 
Franzman suggests that the discourse used by the AfD contributes to a temporary populist 
tactical agenda (Franzmann, 2014, p. 474). The author claims that the founders of the party 
applied a naive electoral political strategy, whereas stated by the author Spiegel magazine 
revealed that Lucke himself encouraged party members to use populist appeal in order to 
attract media attention (Franzmann, 2014, p. 474). 
4.7      The 2017 Manifesto for Germany  
The 2017 AfD election manifesto is titled “Manifesto for Germany.” In the preamble, their 
claim to be open-minded towards other nations and cultures “but wish to be and remain 
German at heart” (AfD, 2017) stands out together with emphasis into retaining the “western 
Christian culture” and keeping common cultural values and historical traditions. Including 
as well but not limited to separation of power, the rule of law and the main goal being “when 
government and all its institutions once again become servants to all citizens in our country,” 
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(AfD, 2017). Already in the preamble, it is clear that although the AfD still mentions the one 
single founding issue. 
When looking at the form of the manifesto and on the content itself, the manifesto has 14 
Chapters and is 93 pages long in comparison to political guidelines 2014 which has only six 
pages. Only four pages long, Chapter 2 is titled “Europe and the Euro” and is among the three 
shortest chapters in the entire manifesto, whereas among the longest is Chapter 1 titled 
“Democracy and Core Values” and Chapter 9 on “Immigration, Integration, and Asylum.”  
Regarding Democracy and Core values, the AfD voiced the introduction of the referendum 
based on the Swiss Model, and it is stated that this element is a “non-negotiable component 
of any coalition agreement signed by the AfD.” The possibility of a coalition remained 
opened.  
4.7.1      Euroscepticism 
Hansen & Olsen (2018) define a Eurosceptic party as a party which achieves votes through 
a platform sharply critical of the EU while at the same time promising to restore economic 
control to national states (p. 2).   
The AfD was from the beginning skeptical towards the European Union. In 2017 manifesto 
it emphasizes the need to restore the powers of nation-states and to oppose efforts towards 
centralization. The AfD advocates the retention of the nation states, the EU is conceived of 
as an undemocratic entity which needs fundamental reform. In line with their claim that 
Germany should not contribute to the centralization of the EU, the AfD rejects the common 
EU Foreign and Security Policy and a common European Foreign Service but does not 
mention the withdrawal of Germany from the EU. Furthermore, the AfD opposed the 
admission of Turkey to the EU for “cultural and geographical reasons” (AfD, 2017) which 
in turn means that the AfD has an idea on how the EU should look like in the future as well. 
Up until 2015, the AfD has been classified as ‘soft’ Eurosceptic party (Lees, 2018, p. 304). 
The AfD has advocated that Germany should withdraw from the EURO monetary union ever 
since its emergence and has not backed away from their position on this issue at the 2017 
manifesto either. Meaning that the party’s most radical position on the EU until 2015 has 
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been precisely that. From 2015 the AfD’s narrative became a breeding ground progressively 
for a more populist and critical approach to the entire German political settlement (Lees, 
2018, p. 305). Furthermore, in the 2017 manifesto, the AfD opens up the possibility to pursue 
the exit of Germany from the European Union itself:  
 
 “Should we not succeed with our ideas of a fundamental reform within the  
 present framework of the European Union, we shall seek Germany‘s exit, or a 
 democratic dissolution of the EU, followed by the founding of a new European 
 economic union.”  
                                                                                     (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 15) 
 
The skeptic attitude of the AfD towards the EU is confirmed by CHES data wherein 2014 
the average level of the AfD support for European Integration was 1.6 whereas in 2017 it 
was 1.81 (on a 7-point scale where 7 equals strongly in favor). Also, the average score on 
relative salience of European integration in the party’s public stance was 9.5 in 2014 and 7.12 
in 2017 (on a 10-point scale where 10 means that European Integration is of great 
importance). The average score on the degree of dissent within the party on European 
integration in 2014 was 1.33 and in 2017 was 2 (on a 10-point scale where 10 means that the 
party was extremely divided). The position of the party in 2014 on EU enlargement to Turkey 
was 1.37 (on a 7-point scale where 7 means strongly in favor). 
 
Over time, the AfD has drifted towards a more critical Eurosceptic position, preferring the 
EU without many of the elements that it currently carries, however, the critique against the 
EU centralism, bureaucracy and dirigisme show that the AfD position was not against the 
EU per se as it was against the currency but was looking for changes within the EU, and  
opposing the increasing power of the European Union. Hence, the AfD can be classified as 
a Eurosceptic party which currently does not look for the withdraw of Germany from the EU 
but instead seeks a fundamental reform of the EU itself. If the fundamental reform does not 
take place, then the party will pursue the exit of the country from the EU.  
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4.7.2      Sociocultural and socioeconomic issues 
The AfD has moved towards supplying unique policy alternatives on the EU, immigration, 
preservation of German culture and identity. For instance, in the national security and justice 
chapter, the AfD wants to re-establish border crossing points and wherever necessary to raise 
fences and set up similar barriers. In the same chapter, one of the AfD’s ways to fight 
organized crime is by simplifying the deportation of “this group of people” referring to 
foreign nationals as according to the AfD “The majority of offenders in the field of organized 
crime are foreign nationals,” (AfD, 2017). In chapter six, section 6.2 is titled “Larger Families 
instead of Mass Immigration” and is further elaborated as follows: 
“Germany’s negative demographic trend has to be counteracted. Mass immigration 
has a high potential for conflict and is not a viable economic solution. The only mid- 
and the longterm solution is to attain a higher birth rate by the native population by 
stimulating family policies.”  
                                                                            (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 40) 
The native element stands out among other things as a core value jointly with their idea of 
traditional family and also brings about the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ Them being 
the immigrants, mainly from the Islamic states: 
“In order to fight the effects of this negative demographic development, political 
parties currently in government support mass immigration, mainly from Islamic 
states, without due consideration of the needs and qualifications of the German labor 
market. During the past few years, it has become evident that Muslim immigrants to 
Germany, in particular, only attain below-average levels of education, training, and 
employment.”  
                                                                            (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 41) 
 
 
The AfD advocates German as a predominant culture as opposed to multiculturalism which 
is ‘blind’ to history:  
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“This culture is derived from three sources: firstly, the religious traditions of 
Christianity; secondly, the scientific and humanistic heritage, whose ancient roots 
were renewed during the period of Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment; and 
thirdly, Roman law, upon which our constitutional state is founded.” 
                                                                            (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 46) 
Multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to social peace and the German cultural identity. 
Accordingly, the AfD makes a sharp distinction between the Germanic race and 
multiculturalism and Islam (Klikauer, 2018, p. 618). In line with that, Islam is seen as a 
religion that does not belong to Germany: 
“Its expansion and the ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country are viewed 
by the AfD as a danger to our state, our society, and our values. An Islam which 
neither respects nor refrains from being in conflict with our legal system or that even 
lays claim to power as the only true religion is incompatible with our legal system 
and our culture.” 
                                                                           (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 48) 
The AfD claims that there is a trend towards radicalization amongst Muslims that live in 
Germany and this must be curbed. The AfD positions towards Islam continue expanding by 
allowing criticism of Islam, ending foreign financing of mosques, prohibiting full-body 
veiling in public spaces, rejecting the minaret the muezzin call and by abolishing theological 
chairs for Islam studies at German universities and to transfer those positions to the faculty 
of religious studies (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 49).  
Chapter 9 talks about immigration, integration, and asylum. The AfD emphasizes the need 
for a change in underlying assumptions in asylum immigration and argues that it is necessary 
to make a distinction between political refugees and people fleeing from the war on the one 
hand, and irregular migrants on the other (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 49). The AfD is 
willing to grant shelter in Germany to the true refugees that are escaping from the war in the 
country of origin, but not to the irregular migrants. However, the true refugees should leave 
Germany as soon as the reasons for fleeing from their country are no longer valid. It is further 
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emphasized the need to tackle the issue outside of the European Union by setting up shelters 
and upgrading the existing shelters in countries in the region where migration comes from. 
The AfD wants to alter the immigration from other EU countries to Germany:  
“The AfD, therefore, calls for a comprehensive and thorough realignment of EU 
legislation to regain a national course of action and to put an end to widespread misuse 
of rights related to the Free Movement Directive. If this should not be effective, we 
demand a restriction of free movement within the EU, allowing the host country to 
control the immigration of job-seekers and their family members.” 
                                                                           (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 60). 
  
The party supports moderate legal immigration from non-EU countries which are highly-
skilled immigrants that are willing to integrate and the same is valuable from other EU 
countries. The importance of integration is stressed in section 9.4 which is titled “Integration 
is more than just Learning the German Language” where assimilation is seen as the most 
advanced form of integration which is worth striving for, yet, it cannot be enforced, and 
integration is seen as an obligation (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 62). On German 
citizenship issue, the AfD wants to end the practice where children are given German 
citizenship automatically without any of their parents being German. Instead, they propose: 
“German citizenship should only be granted to immigrants who have come of age. 
This will rule out the automatic granting of German citizenship to children of foreign 
parents, as this has been a source of considerable abuse. Such children should only 
receive German citizenship where at least one parent is already a German citizen.” 
                                                                           (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p. 64) 
 
The AfD has not abandoned its positions in regards the European Union; however, anti-
immigrant/nativist themes have been prioritized in the 2017 party manifesto.   
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The CMP data from 2013 to 2017 confirm that the AfD has been increasingly more concerned 
with the newer sociocultural dimension than other German parties, specifically on the issue 
of traditional and religious moral values, law and order, national way of life, civic 
mindedness (defined as appeals for national solidarity) and multiculturalism as negative. 
Differently, although the socioeconomic dimensions have taken more space after 2013, the 
data confirm that the AfD has been less concerned with socioeconomic issues in comparison 
with the sociocultural dimension. The broader issue agenda means that the AfD has become 
less of a niche party, although issues such as Euro and anti-EU sentiment still are important 
topics.  
In addition, according to CHES expert survey, on the immigration issue, the AfD’s average 
in 2014 is 9.30 whereas in 2017 9.31 (in a 10-point scale where 10 means that they favor a 
restrictive policy on immigration). The same is valuable for their position on multiculturalism 
where the AfD scores 9.22 in 2014 in comparison to 2017 with 9.86 (in a 10-point scale 
where 10 means that the party strongly favors assimilation). Furthermore, the AfD strongly 
opposes more rights for ethnic minorities scoring 8.8 in 2014 and 8.6 in 2017 (10-point scale) 
and strongly promotes nationalist conceptions of society scoring 8.69 (10-point scale). On 
ideological question, the position of the party regarding its ideological stance in 2014 was 
8.92 whereas 9.18 in 2017 (in 10-point scale, where 10 equals extreme right). The average 
party ideological stance on economic issues has been 8.33 in 2014 and 7.53 in 2017. (same 
10-point scale). Parties on the economic right do not want the government to play an active 
role in the economy. 
Furthermore, the relative salience of economic issues in the AfD’s public stance in 2014 has 
been 8.46 in comparison to 2017 where it has decreased to 3.33 (in a 10-point scale where 
10 equals great importance.) In 2014, on the AfD’s positions on democratic freedoms and 
right, the average party score was 8.69 while 9.46 in 2017 (in a 10-point scale where 0 was 
libertarian/postmaterialist, and 10 was traditional/authoritarian.) The relative salience of 
traditional issues in the party’s public stance has been 5.66 in 2014 and 9.28 in 2017 (in a 10-
point scale where 10 equals great importance.)  
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Furthermore, on the expert responses to the most important issues questions in the case of 
the AfD, the results are as follows: 
 
1. The most important issue for the party of the course of 2014 has been EU integration. 
2. The second most prominent issue has been immigration. 
3. A third most important issue has been public services vs. taxes. 
Different from the 2014 survey, the 2017 survey has questions regarding populism and 
internal party democracy as well. On the question on direct versus representative democracy 
(people versus elite), the AfD scores 7.6 (in a 10-point scale where 10 means that “the 
people”, not the elite should make the most critical decisions. The salience of anti-
establishment and anti-elite rhetoric notches a 9.68 (in a 10-point scale where 10 means 
equals extremely important) whereas on the salience of reducing political corruption scores 
a 5 (10- point scale). The final question on the survey examines whether the party policy 
choices are controlled by members or leadership and the AfD scores 6.2 (in a 10-point scale 
where 10 means that leadership has complete control over party policy choices).  
If we look at the expert-level data from 2017 dataset we see that there is a unity among 
experts when it comes to the overall orientation of the AfD’s leadership towards European 
Integration meaning that out of 17 experts the majority of them believes that the AfD 
leadership is either strongly opposed or opposed towards European Integration. The same 
goes for the ideological question on the position of the party regarding its overall ideological 
stance where unanimously the experts believe that the AfD belongs on the extreme right 
(with 13 nines and three 10’s.) Furthermore, most of the experts believe the clarity of the 
party position on economic issues is not clear, with one expert believing that the party 
position on economic issues is unequivocal. On the other hand, most of the experts agree, 
that the salience of economic issues in the party’s public stance does not hold much 
importance. All of them agree that the AfD belongs to the traditional/authoritarian spectrum 
when it comes to their views on democratic freedoms and right, valuing more order, tradition, 
and stability, similarly agreeing that the party position on libertarian/traditional issues is 
evident with one exclusion which believes that it is not that clear.  
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When it comes to the immigration policy the experts agree that the AfD fully supports 
restrictive immigration policy and strongly favors assimilation, however, with one expert 
believing that the AfD is opposed to a restrictive policy on the issue, although all of them 
agree that the salience of immigration policy is of a great importance and an issue on which 
the party was completely united.  
 
On the populism and internal party democracy questions, specifically on the question about 
the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric the experts wholeheartedly agree that 
it is imperative, however when it comes to their position on whether members or leadership 
has control on party policy choices the experts do not agree, as some claim that members 
have a say (seven) and the rest believe that the leadership has the control over policy choices. 
However, most of them do not agree strongly on the latter as well. 
In sum, the AfD has increasingly transformed from a Eurosceptic party which was initially 
(Arzheimer, 2015) to a radical right party. The AfD has not given up its original positions 
about the EU. However it has increasingly emphasized more nativist elements which further 
contribute to the radical dimension of the party. Furthermore, when looking at the way the 
AfD has used the social media (Facebook and Twitter) it becomes clear that the party has 
developed a vote-seeking strategy by emphasizing more issues such as immigration although 
in the 2017 manifesto the immigration and economy have both taken almost equal attention. 
While looking at social media strategy used by the AfD Serrano et al. (2018) find that the 
AfD intentionally hid their economic proposals on social media and focused on immigration 
(Serrano et al. 12018, p. 11).  
 
4.7.3      The anti-establishment profile  
Anti-establishment dimension and the extreme reputation of the party constitute a core 
element to assess whether the party has changed its anti-establishment profile and if it has 
tried to overcome the extremist reputation. As clarified in the theoretical framework chapter, 
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anti-establishment parties are classified as such because of the ideological distance that they 
have with the system itself.  
In the 2014 Political Guidelines and 2017 Manifesto, the lack of democracy in decision-
making in Germany is criticized. In public speeches, similar comments are much more 
common. Patton (2017) finds that after 2015 the AfD followed a more openly anti-
establishment strategy where Björn Höcke as head of the Thuringia party branch organized 
massive street protests against Merkel’s refugee policies (Patton, 2017, p.4). In a 2014 study 
Berbuir et al. find that the AfD exhibits a strong anti-establishment attitude (Berbuir et al. 
2014, p. 156) and later on the study they look at several campaign posters to illustrate the 
anti-establishment strategy followed by the AfD and find that although the poster broach 
different issues, they refer to the same dichotomy in which the party portrays itself as the 
only bearer of the truth (Berbuir et al. 2014, p. 165). Also, the political establishment in 
Germany is seen as responsible for the Euro crisis on the one hand, and the decline of 
traditional social values on the other (Berbuir et al. 2014, p. 173).  
  
In line with the criteria on how to identity, an anti-establishment party outlined by Hartleb 
(2015) in the methodological framework chapter and looking at the 2017 Manifesto for 
Germany the AfD has kept and increasingly developed its anti-establishment profile because: 
 
1. It has ‘an alternative’ “to the German Exit” and to offer Germany “a true political 
alternative” (AfD, 2017, p.5).   
2. Blames the mainstream media for presenting them in a negative light (Serrano et al. 
2018,3).  
 
3. It constructs a homogenous people in terms of a general will (i.e., Islam goes against 
German values, German) and creates a front line against the mainstream parties and political 
elite as follows:   
 
 “Behind the scenes a small and powerful elite within the political parties is secretly
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 in charge and is responsible for the misguided development of past decades. It is this 
 political class of career politicians whose foremost interest is to retain their own 
 power base, status, and material well-being. It is a political cartel which operates the 
 levers of government power, insofar as these have not been transferred to the EU.” 
                                                                                         (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p 7.) 
4. It has the label of an opposition party and that it does not belong in the conventional group 
of German political parties as it claims that it is different from other parties and as such 
represents the real voice of the people as “our Members of Parliament have forfeited their 
role as true representatives of the German people” (AfD, 2017, p. 10). 
5. It openly demands forms of direct democracy and advocates the introduction of referenda 
in Germany based on the Swiss model (AfD, 2017, p. 8). 
6. It calls on the will of the majority of the people.  
7. It simplifies the political issues by pointing the finger towards the Euro, Islam, immigrants, 
and the political elite.  
 
8. The image of a taboo-breaker is part of the AfD as well because it pushes forwards topics 
such as the remembrance of the time of National Socialism and calls for openness while 
seeking a broader understanding of history (AfD, 2017, p 47).  
9. Claims not to be part of Germany’s power elite (cited in Klikauer, 2018, p. 619).  
 
Also, according to CHES data 2014 on the issue salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite 
rhetoric, the AfD scores 7.77 (10-point scale where 10 equals extremely importance) whereas 
in 2017 there is a significant increase on the issue salience with 9.68 which means that the 
AfD anti-establishment rhetoric has further increased. Additionally, Hansen and Olsen 
(2018) while examining the voters of the AfD in 2017 federal election found that the support 
of the AfD by the electorate was driven only by two factors: 1) their attitudes towards 
immigrants/refugees; and 2) anti-establishment sentiment/satisfaction with democracy in 
Germany (Hansen & Olsen, 2018, p. 1). With that said, considering that the AfD’s anti-
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establishment strategy in public has been remarkably effective in terms of appealing to the 
electorate, especially in East Germany, as confirmed by the data it is just reasonable to expect 
that the party has further heightened its nativist and anti-establishment profile and as such 
the anti-establishment dimension is a core value of the party.  
 
One year on, the AfD in the Bundestag 
When looking at the AfD’s behavior and actions in the Bundestag after one year in the 
parliament we can see that the use of provocations and going beyond commonly accepted 
communication standards is done to get more public attention by “producing” more content 
for media usage. For instance, this becomes very clear when looking at the acting/speaking 
in a very opportunistic manner through which the AfD members try to “embarrass” members 
of other political parties in the Bundestag (Ruhose, 2019, p. 3- 4). Although it is often 
presumed that political parties tend to soften down after becoming part of the parliament, 
political scientist Christoph Butterwegge argues that that is not the case with the AfD. 
Instead, the AfD has followed an aggressive, confrontational and provocative discourse 
(Doering, 2018). He adds that the AfD is doing this intentionally to demonstrate to their base 
of support that they have not abandoned the radical element that characterizes them just 
because they are in parliament (Doering, 2018). Jacqueline Westermann, a researcher at 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, argues as follows:  
 
 “In the 12 months that the AfD has been in the Bundestag, it has changed the debating 
 culture. AfD members are provocative and they have polarized debate and disrupted 
 long-established procedures. They regularly interrupt debates with loud and derisive 
 laughter to denigrate opponents and attract attention to themselves. While such 
 behavior is not unheard of even in the normally ordered Bundestag, the AfD has     
 taken it to a new level.”  (Westermann, 2018.) 
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4.7.4      Right-wing radicals of the AfD 
A brief introduction of the most influential leaders of the AfD is necessary as the questions 
regarding their political stances, of what they represent and to which group they belong act 
as an effective tool to comprehend and analyze the gradual transformation of the AfD.  
In 2017, Bento platform carried out a research which examined the views of the AfD’s 
candidates, with a high probability of them being members of the Bundestag, through a 
systematic analysis of their social media profiles and news reports. The results of the 35 
candidates were compiled in a table which included the names of the candidates, federal state, 
rank, and other pieces of information such as statements, biography data, and sources. The 
findings revealed that of the 94 candidates that were analyzed, 35 could be identified as 
"right-wing radicals" (Chase, 2017). 
Also, it is important to note that the fundamental distinction between right and radical-right 
itself is not clear. The terms intersect meaning that it is difficult to establish in which sense 
right contrasts with radical-right. The lack of distinctness can be witnessed in the party 
speeches and statements. For instance, the term ‘Umvolkung’ which in Nazi ideology 
describes the process of assimilating the members of the German people, so that they would 
forget their language and origin, is used (Fahlbusch, 2000). There are also remarks about 
Merkel is seen as a traitor to the country, the fundamental rights that do not apply to Muslims 
in the future and the demand to end the ‘guilt cult’ regarding the Germans in the Second 
World War (cf. Wilhelm von Gottberg and Alexander Gauland) (Reißmann, 2017). 
Alexander Gauland, the second leading candidate of the AfD, went as far as to make a bold 
statement on the German role in the First and Second World War by stating that Germans 
“[have] the right to be proud of the achievements of German soldiers in two world wars,” 
(Röhlig & Lakämper, 2017). 
There are also increasing extremist tendencies or inclinations that are present within the 
party. Some reports claim that the AfD does/did not only tolerate extremists, but they 
preferably added them to the list of candidates for the 2017 Federal Elections (Reißmann, 
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2017). Moreover, the research that was published and conducted by the Bento platform which 
was mentioned earlier demonstrates that some of the candidates could also be easily classified 
as right-wing extremists (Reißmann, 2017). Thus, although one of the AfD leaders Alice 
Weidel points out that there have been only some isolated cases when asked about the 
members of the AfD giving extremist statements, it is apparent that the party has welcomed 
extremism rather enthusiastically. For example, this can be proved by the statements of the 
candidates who wanted media censorship back, one of them being Tino Chrupalla who 
argued that the Basic Law is “not set in stone,” and therefore it can be changed (Reißmann, 
2017). 
I want to suggest that the language used by the representatives of the AfD does not only 
emphasize the concept of right and radical-right, but it also shows that although the party had 
initially focused on sociocultural dimension, later on, they have shifted to the moral 
categorizations as well. This point can be illustrated by the examples of the statements given 
by several AfD figures who were analyzed by Bento. For example, Björn Höcke refers to the 
Memorial of the Murdered Jews of Europe, which is also known as the Holocaust Memorial, 
by saying the following: “The Germans are the only nation in the world who build a 
monument of shame in their capital,” (Röhlig & Lakämper, 2017). Höcke was also mentioned 
by Jens Maier who said that "this man is [his] hope" (Röhlig & Lakämper, 2017). Maier 
continues by stating that Höcke is afraid of the "production of mixed people" that threatens 
to wipe out the German national identity (Röhlig & Lakämper, 2017). After his speech, 
Höcke was reprimanded by the party leaders for damaging the image of the party. 
Notwithstanding, the internal court of the party in Thuringia decided that his speech has not 
violated the regulations of the party (Dubois, 2018).  
In addition to Maier and Höcke, there are also other noteworthy candidates such as Enrico 
Komning who has several times expressed sympathy for Pegida and is accused of an unclear 
relationship with right-wing extremism (Biermann et al. 2016). Furthermore, in early 2014 
Bernd Lucke criticized the media for praising Thomas Hitzelsperger courage in outing 
himself (Franzmann T. S., 2014, p. 475). Lucke noted that “given that Berlin had a gay mayor 
and there is an openly gay former secretary of state – not much courage is needed to come 
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out as gay” (Franzmann T. S., 2014, p. 475). Despite Lucke being distinguished for his 
position on the euro issue, he shows his conservative standpoint on social issues in this 
statement, nonetheless. 
 
4.7.5      The extreme reputation of the party  
The reputation of the party is a highly important issue. As clarified in the German party-
system: a political and legal overview chapter the Article 21 of the German Basic Law is 
handy as it sets in context how legal norms in Germany can impact, shape, and limit the 
agenda and patterns of engagement of the AfD as it contains strict safeguards against 
extremism. As shown earlier, positive references to anti-Semitism, racism, Nazism or 
keeping ties with extremists and extremists’ groups instead of distancing itself from them 
have been part of the AfD.  
Karsten Grabow (2016) while assessing the differences/similarities between the AfD and 
Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA) argues that both 
parties have come to be two sides of the same coin:  
 
 “The two organizations benefit from the same overall political trends, primarily 
 concerning the refugee crisis. They address the same issues, they have the same 
 demands, they share the same bogeyman and they use the same style of propaganda. 
 AfD officials and PEGIDA speakers have repeatedly attacked representatives of the 
 state personally and in highly offensive ways. Finally, a large proportion of 
 PEGIDA’s followers prefer the AfD above all other German parties (Patzelt 
 2016b, 183–6).”     
               (Grabow, 2016, p. 175) 
In addition, after a man was stabbed to death in Chemnitz on September 2018 (in the eastern 
part, supposedly by two immigrants which were identified as the main suspects) a high 
numbers of the AfD and PEGIDA supporters turned to streets in a series of protests where 
clashes with the police took place, including a number of xenophobic attacks (Shalal, 2018). 
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Although a few members of the AfD are being monitored for suspected links to anti-Islamic 
and ‘right-wing extremists,’ already (Nasr, 2018), there have been calls for Germany’s 
domestic intelligence agency to monitor the AfD after “mounting evidence of its links to neo-
Nazi groups” reports The Guardian (Osborne, 2018). 
 
Considering the developments, lately, the AfD leadership has increasingly become more 
aware of the threat that comes from the Article 21 regarding the existence of the party itself 
and also because of the high possibility that an authoritarian reputation can lead to a decrease 
on support by the electorate. On November 2018, the AfD has expelled a member of its 
parliamentary group in Berlin because of a photo where the politician is seen with some wine 
bottles in the background with labels illustrating Hitler (Osborne, 2018). This was followed 
by a strong reaction from the AfD’s Berlin state and parliamentary group head saying that 
“the photos were unacceptable” further indicating that the AfD has begun the proceedings 
“to expel Bießmann from the party,” (Osborne, 2018). The list of the people being expelled 
from the party continues with other members after allegations are brought up that individual 
members of the party have participated in celebrations for Adolf Hitler’s birthday or other 
cases for having ties with right-wing extremists (Chambers, 2018). Furthermore, recently the 
AfD leadership has taken into consideration the possibility of dissolving entirely the Young 
Alternative (AfD’s youth organization) due to concerns that they are increasingly 
radicalizing and becoming more like the ethno-nationalist and anti-Semitic Identarian 
Movement (Schumacher, 2018). These developments indicate that the party is taking steps 
to penalize members that show ties with extremist groups of movements. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this single case study was to assess whether the AfD has moved towards the 
mainstream and if such a shift has taken place to investigate the main factors that have 
prompted this transformation. The conclusions from this study follow the research questions 
and the findings and therefore address four dimensions: 1) changes with respect to radical 
positions on core issues; 2) changes from a niche party to a party with a broader policy 
agenda; 3) changes in anti-establishment profile; and 4) changes to an extremist reputation 
of the party. Following is a discussion of the major findings and conclusions drawn from this 
research. 
 
Radicalness 
The literature has shown several ways through which the right-wing radical parties show 
their radicalism, including but not limited to rejection of immigration, rejection of the EU 
itself, authoritarianism and has been found that radical right-wing parties are focused on 
issues that are connected to national identity and security. Concerning that, issues that stand 
out on the threat for the society come from immigration, different religious background 
(Islam) and multiculturalism. 
Regarding changes concerning radical positions on core issues, the AfD presents a case of 
what initially was a single-issue anti-Euro party that gradually has radicalized from 2013 up 
to now. In 2015, the shift towards radicalization was sped up by the changes in leadership as 
the liberal economic wing as overpowered by the national conservative wing. The 
radicalization has occurred policy-wise on core issues such as immigration, authoritarianism, 
and European Integration. Furthermore, the AfD has further cultivated its nativist profile, 
especially in eastern Germany where increasingly has adopted xenophobic, nativist, law, and 
order rhetoric where the cracks from the communist past are still open and the AfD is using 
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it strategically to its advantage. Also, although the AfD has not abandoned its positions 
concerning the European Union, nativist themes have been prioritized in the 2017 manifesto. 
First, the AfD stance on immigration has always been hardline, but it has become even more 
strict after 2015 migrant crisis in Europe with the party fully supporting restrictive 
immigration policy while emphasizing much more the issue of immigration in comparison 
to 2014. The party strategically focused on immigration, and the anti-immigration discourse 
was pushed forward by the AfD constantly considering that their position on the issue was 
one of the main factors why the electorate has decided to vote for the AfD.  
The second core issue is European integration which has shaped its public image initially. In 
the beginning, the positions of the party on European integration were not as hard as they 
became to be later on. Initially, the AfD was referred to as the ‘anti-euro’ party and that the 
focal aim of the party was to get Germany out of the Eurozone. Later on, in the 2014 political 
guidelines, a large part refers to the European and the euro crisis, however, in the 2017 
manifesto, the Eurozone was not the main issue for the party. Notwithstanding, in the 2017 
manifesto the AfD opens up the possibility to pursue the exit of Germany from the European 
Union which means that over the time the party has taken a more critical Eurosceptic 
position. Thus, besides looking for fundamental changes in the EU, the party eventually 
might pursue the exit of Germany from the EU if the implementation of the fundamental 
needed reforms does not occur.  
The third core issue is authoritarianism. The AfD has become increasingly more 
authoritarian. There is a call for a strong authoritarian state, and the AfD voters embrace 
authoritarian views much more in comparison to those that do not support the party. From 
the 2017 manifesto, it becomes noticeably clear that the party positions go against some of 
the core values of democratic regimes, including tolerance, and the protection of minorities 
and their rights. To sum up, the AfD has increasingly radicalized its positions on core issues 
related to their nationalist ideology such as immigration, European integration, and 
authoritarianism. 
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Niche profile 
‘Nicheness’ is primarily a matter of how strongly the AfD has emphasized certain issues. 
There are two main categories, and the first category includes sociocultural issues while the 
second category includes socioeconomic issues. The literature has shown that if the policy 
agenda of a party evolves around sociocultural issues but increasingly emphasized 
socioeconomic issue as well, therefore this greater emphasis by the AfD on socioeconomic 
dimension can be considered an indicator of mainstreaming. Concerning niche profile, 
although the AfD has increasingly emphasized sociocultural issues, the agenda has expanded 
to socioeconomic dimensions as well after 2013. In comparison, the salience of the 
sociocultural issues has further increased with a more a noticeable resistance on issues such 
as immigration, multiculturalism, dedicated support for the preservation of German culture, 
identity, and assimilation. Thus, as confirmed by CMP data the policy issues on the 
sociocultural dimension are more salient than socioeconomic issues. A broader issue agenda 
means that the party has amended its niche character and has deliberately switched between 
niche and mainstream profiles due to strategic incentives. This strategic behavior is 
confirmed when looking at the way the AfD used social media where it became clear that 
although on the 2017 manifesto the economy and immigration issues had taken almost equal 
space, the party intentionally hid their economic profile and focused on immigration.  
 
Anti-establishment profile  
Concerning the anti-establishment dimension, the AfD has further cultivated its anti-
establishment profile by holding anti-establishment positions and by challenging the rules of 
the game. Periodically before the 2014 EP election, the AfD has decreased its populist and 
anti-establishment stances strategically while in 2014, it was found that the AfD exhibits a 
strong anti-establishment attitude. After 2015, the AfD has followed more openly an anti-
establishment strategy. Furthermore, as shown on the analytical part, the support of the 
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electorate for the AfD in the 2017 election was driven by anti-establishment sentiment.  In 
line with the criteria on what constitutes an anti-establishment party it has been found that 
the AfD has increased its anti-establishment rhetoric continuingly by branding itself as ‘an 
alternative’, blaming the media for presenting them in negative light, constructing a 
homogenous general will, openly demanding direct democracy, it claims that it is different 
from other parties and represents the real voice of the people.  In the parliament, the AfD has 
been increasingly less cooperative with other parties in parliament and has followed an 
aggressive and provocative discourse, as well as introducing obstructive methods such as 
interrupting debates with loud laughter which in turn means that the AfD challenges the rules 
of the game. In conclusion, the AfD has radicalized from 2013 up to now regarding its anti-
establishment behavior, and anti-establishment behavior is a core value of the party. 
 
Extreme Reputation  
Finally, the final dimension of mainstreaming is that of a party’s reputation.  In the past the 
AfD has shown itself to be a home for right-wing extremists, however, with respect to an 
extreme right reputation recently the AfD has taken some efforts to shed their extremist 
reputation by expelling members of the party that have had ties with extremists and looking 
at the possibility of dissolving entirely the Young Alternative. The AfD gives the impression 
that it is doing so only to avoid possible juridical actions which again shows that the AfD is 
acting strategically.  
This work is embedded in the general framework of Akkerman et al. (2016). Akkerman et 
al. examined whether the established radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe 
have moved from the margins to the mainstream and if yes, looked at the reasons why the 
parties have done so. The comparative analyses explain that radical right-wing populist 
parties have not moved into the mainstream (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 47). The individual 
case studies confirm that on the first dimension (radicalness) radical right-wing populist 
parties have remained radical in their positions on core issues (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 276).  
On the second dimension concerning niche profiles, it is confirmed that the radical right-
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wing populist parties are quite flexible, influenced by external factors, and act strategically 
when pursuing office (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 277). Different from the comparative 
analyses, the case studies confirm that one of the significant changes has occurred on the 
third dimension (anti-establishment) as radical right-wing populist parties’ parties tend to 
moderate their positions and respect the rules of the game due to office-seeking and 
participation (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 277). Finally, on the fourth dimension (party’s 
reputation) it has been found that radical right-wing populist parties avoid a classic extremist 
reputation for two main reasons: 1) out of fear of legal measures; 2) due to office-seeking 
and vote-seeking reasons (Akkerman et al. 2016, p. 277). As a result, the increase of radical 
right-wing populist parties in Western Europe might push the mainstream parties to shift 
further towards the right.   
Finally, taking all into account, the conclusions of this study confirm that the AfD has 
followed the overall trend of other radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe as 
there are no significant indicators that the AfD is shifting towards the mainstream, instead, 
the AfD is tending to radicalize along three dimensions. In the fourth dimension, recently the 
AfD is trying to detoxify its extremist reputation, and this endeavor is pushed forward out of 
fear of exclusion through a legal ban and possibility of being monitored by the German 
domestic intelligence agency.  
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